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1  Introduction 
 
Armed conflict has been part of human history since time immemorial. Eighteenth century 
political economist Thomas Malthus in his essay entitled An Essay on the Principle of 
Population noted that faced with resource scarcity, armed conflict is a key strategy for 
humans in their struggle for existence. Charles Darwin was also inspired by Malthus' work 
when he professed that conflict and competition over scarce resources are germane to the 
evolutionary strategies of species in their quest for survival in the natural world. Even though 
armed conflict is integral to the process of allocation of scarce resources, the interrelationship 
between the two is not very well understood. Provocative theories on the relative power of 
greed and grievances abound, the true causes of conflict in the resource rich regions of Africa 
remains largely unknown. 
Until recently, research on the interrelationship between natural resources and 
intrastate civil conflict stood on the periphery of the economics discipline.3 The past decade 
however witnessed a surge in research on conflict. Indeed, a large body of macro cross-
country literature documents positive relationship between natural resources and conflict.4 
The emphasis is on the role of economic motives as opposed to social motives in triggering 
conflict. For example, access to an oil rig or a mine could provide lucrative financial 
opportunities to rebel leaders to build and sustain rebel organisations which would encourage 
armed conflict. This could override atypical social motives such as inequality, political 
repression, and ethno-religious divisions. 
Establishing causality has been the key motivation in this literature. Chilling examples 
of conflict in Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Sudan and other resource rich 
regions of Africa often tempt scholars to argue that resources cause conflict. Yet establishing 
causality has remained illusory largely due to the obvious limitations associated with cross-
country studies. Furthermore, lack of useful data for Africa limits the scope for adequately 
examining the causal link. 
In this paper we aim to systematically explore the causal effect of oil and mineral 
discoveries on intra-state armed conflict onset, intensity, and incidence in Africa at the grid-
cell level corresponding to a spatial resolution of 0.5 x 0.5 degrees latitude and longitude. 
Using detailed georeferenced data on resource (oil and mineral) discoveries and armed 
conflict, we are able to construct a quasi-natural experiment to establish causality. In other 
words, we are able to test whether resource discovery as an exogenous news shock has any 
bearing over conflict onset, intensity, and incidence at the local level in Africa. We also 
discuss the plausibility of channels through which natural resource discovery shocks affect 
the intra-state armed conflict. We use three different datasets containing the geographical 
location of conflict events in Africa: the PRIO-GRID conflict dataset, the Armed Conflict 
Location and Event Dataset (ACLED) and the Uppsala Conflict Data Program Georeferenced 
Event Dataset (UCDP GED). These datasets cover different time periods and countries. The 
three datasets allow us to use alternative definitions of armed conflict: onset, incidence, and 
intensity. 
The paper makes the following contributions to the literature. First, the paper uses a 
novel geocoded dataset of resource (minerals and oil) 5 discovery at the grid-cell level. This 
dataset have been used by Mamo et al. (2019) to examine the effects of mines on local living 
                                                 
3Note that conflict here implies intra-state civil conflict. We do not analyse the relationship between 
natural resources and interstate wars. For a recent study on oil and interstate wars see Caselli et al. (2015).  
4See Blattman and Miguel (2010) and Nillesen and Bulte (2014) for a survey of this literature.  
5The dataset includes copper, diamond, fluorite, gold, graphite, lead, manganese, mineral sands, nickel, 
niobium, PGE, phosphate, platinum, potash, rare earths, silver, uranium, zinc, zircon, oil and gas. The long 
appendix (Table A.1) presents additional descriptive statistics.  
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standards in Africa. Second, the study presents results on the effect of resource discovery on 
conflict using grid-cell level data and finds no statistically significant effect. This is a 
departure from the existing grid-cell level study of natural resources and conflict which tend 
to focus on the use of resource deposit values as a source of exogenous variation and report a 
positive effect (Berman et al., 2017). We do the same here by interacting discoveries with 
post discovery commodity price as a measure of expected discovery value and the results 
remain unchanged. Third, using discovery as a news shock we are able to track the 
heterogeneous intertemporal effects of resource extraction. Resource extraction is a stepwise 
temporal process involving discovery, construction, and production all of which could 
potentially have varying effects. The early effects of a discovery news shock are expectation 
induced whereas later effects are likely to be driven by actual revenue. We are able to make 
this distinction here and these results are new. Fourth, we use three different grid-cell level 
datasets on conflict in Africa and find consistent results across datasets. Fifth, we investigate 
the potential heterogeneous effects of natural resource discovery on armed conflict by the 
size of discovery, type of discovery, and time-varying proximity to the discovery yielding 
new results. Finally, our study is able to cover all African countries (including both North 
Africa and sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries) at the grid-cell level potentially offering 
credible external validity of the findings. 
The popular discourse both within the academy and the press is that competition over 
resource wealth in Africa is the root cause of armed conflict. Several cross-national studies 
support this view (Collier and Hoeffler, 1998, 2004; Humphreys, 2005). Fearon (2005) and 
Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2009) however challenge this view. The positive association 
between natural resources and conflict is not borne out in our grid-cell level geocoded data. 
Contrary to some of the cross-country results, we find that oilfield and mineral discoveries 
significantly reduce the likelihood of intra-state armed conflict onset post resource discovery 
in a pooled cross-section set up with a sample of 48 African countries observed over the 
period 1950 to 2008. The effect remains negative but statistically insignificant or weakly 
significant in most specifications when we control for high dimension fixed effects (time-
varying common shocks, grid fixed effects, grid-specific time trends, and country x year 
fixed effects) and property rights institutions. We observe little or no heterogeneity in the 
relationship across resource types (minerals or oil), size of discovery (giant or major), 
proximity to discovery locations and national borders, and quality of national political 
institutions measured by Polity2 score. 
We also analyse the effect of resource discovery on armed conflict incidence and 
intensity using the same panel of countries covering the period 1989 to 2012. The smaller 
sample size here is due to the truncated temporal coverage of conflict data from ACLED 
(1997-2012) and UCDP GED (1989-2010). The effect appears to be statistically insignificant 
once we control for high dimension fixed effects. 
We also perform numerous robustness tests and sensitivity analysis to carefully 
validate our results. First, we restrict our sample to observations where at least one oilfield or 
mineral discovery was made during the sample period in order to address the concern that 
observations with oilfield and mineral discoveries are different from others in ways that we 
cannot measure and control for directly (Lei and Michaels, 2014). Second, we restrict our 
sample to grids in which at least one conflict event occurred over the sample period. Berman 
and Couttenier (2015) refer to such grids as high-conflict-risk grids. Third, we apply buffer 
zone analysis in order to address the potential concern that oilfield and mineral discoveries 
could take up large geographies and hence influence the surrounding geographies of intra-
state armed conflict. Finally, we also estimate the model using logit and Poisson regressions. 
The results remain broadly unchanged. 
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The obvious question here is via what channel resource discovery affects intra-state 
armed conflict. We find that resource discovery improves luminosity (or wellbeing) at the 
grid-cell level which in turn reduces armed conflict onset. This is a purely economic 
mechanism. Another plausible mechanism could be the distribution of political patronage by 
the state thereby dissuading citizens and elites from attempting armed rebellion. We also find 
support for this mechanism. 
Our identification strategy relies on the exogenous variation in the discovery dates of 
oilfield and mineral deposits. Our dataset allows us to distinguish between giant and major 
discoveries. Even though it is possible to identify the area where minerals or oil are likely to 
be found using geological data, it is not possible to accurately predict the timing of giant and 
major discoveries (Arezki et al., 2017; Bhattacharyya et al., 2017; Mamo et al., 2019). 
Therefore, the discovery dates of giant and major reserves are likely to be exogenous. One 
might argue that politicians and government could manipulate the announcement of the 
precise timing of discovery. Our data is immune to such possibility as the discovery dates are 
independently verified and documented using multiple sources. More discussion on this 
follows in Section 4. 
How random is resource discovery? Resource discovery could be a product of 
exploration effort and the latter could be influenced by pre-existing conflict and weak 
property rights. We present estimates with grid-cell level property rights, past discoveries, 
grid-cell and year fixed effects, grid-cell specific trends, and country-year fixed effects as 
controls. We use exclusion of an ethnic group from state power as a measure of property 
rights institutions at the grid-cell level. We also present estimates with ‘first’ and ‘single first’ 
resource discoveries which are rarer events than resource discovery. These issues are 
discussed further in Section 4. 
Administrative boundary demarcation could be a potential source of endogeneity. For 
instance, administrative boundary demarcations in a country could be determined by political, 
geographic and demographic characteristics of the area. This could in turn be correlated with 
both local conflict dynamics and natural resource extraction contaminating the coefficient 
estimate. This is less of a concern here as our main unit of analysis is a grid-cell of resolution 
0.5 x 0.5 degrees. The grid cell level data by construction is independent of political, 
geographic and demographic characteristics and therefore is exogenous to conflict and 
resource discovery. Nevertheless, we also check the effect of resource discovery on conflict 
at the 1 x 1 degrees resolution, region and country levels. We use 0.5 x 0.5 degrees resolution 
because it is common in the literature. See for example, Alesina et al. (2012), Michalopoulos 
and Papaioannou (2013), Berman et al. (2017), Besley and Reynal-Querol (2014) and 
Berman and Couttenier (2015). 
Another source of bias could be the fact that mines and oil rigs are often military 
targets in a conflict giving rise to a positive association between the two variables without 
any actual causal link. Again, this is less of a concern here as we are finding negative or no 
association between resource discovery and conflict. 
Our paper is broadly related to the resource curse literature. Auty (2001), Gylfason 
(2001) and Sachs and Warner (2001, 2005) note that resource rich countries on average grow 
much slower than resource poor countries. Subsequent studies have argued that natural 
resources may lower economic performance because they strengthen powerful groups, 
weaken legal frameworks, and foster rent-seeking activities (Tornell and Lane, 1999; Besley, 
2007). Others have argued whether natural resources are a curse or a blessing depends on 
country-specific circumstances especially institutional quality (Mehlum et al., 2006; 
Robinson et al., 2006; Bhattacharyya and Hodler, 2010, 2014; Bhattacharyya and Collier, 
2014), natural resource type (Isham et al., 2005) and ethnic fractionalisation (Hodler, 2006). 
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More specifically, our paper is also related to the literature documenting the effect of 
natural resource wealth and income on conflict. Recent theoretical studies argue that the 
likelihood of conflict is related to three key variables (Besley and Persson, 2009, 2011). The 
prize for the winner in a conflict is increasing in natural resource rent. Therefore resources 
increase the likelihood of conflict. Higher wages in contrast increases the opportunity cost of 
fighting and hence reduces the likelihood of conflict. Weak institutions and lack of state 
capacity to raise revenue compromises inclusivity of political institutions and hence increases 
the likelihood of conflict. In a nuanced general equilibrium model, Dal Bo and Dal Bo (2011) 
show that resource boom in the form of a favourable price or technology shock diminish 
wages and reduce the opportunity cost of conflict. 
In spite of the apparent theoretical clarity, estimating the causal relationship between 
natural resources and conflict has been challenging. Several macro cross-national studies 
such as Collier and Hoeffler (1998, 2004); Humphreys (2005) and Bruckner and Ciccone 
(2010) report robust positive relationship between resource dependence and conflict.6 
However, Fearon (2005) point out that these results cannot be interpreted as causal since they 
could be driven by omitted variables and endogeneity. Furthermore, Fearon and Laitin (2003) 
identify weak institutions as the main cause of conflict rather than natural resources. 
Contemporary cross-national studies have used instrumental variables and exogenous 
news shocks to address endogeneity concerns and identify the causal effect. Miguel et al. 
(2004) use rainfall shocks as an instrument for economic shocks and find that negative 
economic shocks trigger conflict. Cotet and Tsui (2013a) and Lei and Michaels (2014) both 
use giant oilfield discovery as an exogenous news shock to identify the effect of oil on 
conflict onset. The former report no effect while the latter report a positive effect. 
Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2009) examine the effect of resource wealth and find that the 
same in fact reduce the probability of conflict. Overall the cross-country evidence is 
inconclusive. 
Conflict is often localised and therefore local effects could be significant. Local level 
studies of natural resources and conflict are rare barring a few exceptions. Angrist and Kugler 
(2008) study the effects of upsurge in coca prices and cultivation on civil conflict in 
Colombia. Maystadt et al. (2013) study the Democratic Republic of the Congo and find that 
mineral concessions have no effect on conflict at the lowest administrative unit, but 
significant effect at the higher administrative units. More recently, Berman and Couttenier 
(2015) study how external income shocks affect the probability of conflict events in SSA by 
working with a full grid-cell of 0.5 x 0.5 degrees latitude and longitude. 
Using a similar approach, Berman et al. (2017) study Africa at the cell level 
corresponding to a spatial resolution of 0.5 x 0.5 degrees latitude and longitude and covering 
the period 1997 to 2010. Using data from the ACLED, they find evidence that mineral price 
shifts trigger low-level as well as organised conflict incidents in Africa. Note that ACLED 
offers data since 1997 which truncates the sample. In contrast we are able to use a much 
larger sample of georeferenced data covering the period 1950 to 2008. Nevertheless, we also 
use the ACLED dataset to check robustness of our results. We are able to exploit giant and 
major resource (oilfield and minerals) discovery as exogenous news shocks to identify the 
effects of natural resources on conflict whereas Berman et al. (2017) rely on the value of 
deposits. Note that, deposit value calculation is heavily reliant on certain assumptions on the 
discount rate, the country specific risk premium, the average gestation lag between 
production and discovery, and the average commodity price. Most of these factors are 
unlikely to be exogenous. Furthermore, the value of deposits are also likely to be correlated 
                                                 
6Hegre and Sambanis (2006) and Sambanis (2004) find that the effect of resource dependence on 
conflict onset is not robust. More recently, Bazzi and Blattman (2014) revisit the question and find no robust 
relationship between commodity price shocks and civil war.  
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with exploration effort. International commodity price could be influenced by an 
internationalised local conflict. Internationalised local conflicts could influence global 
geopolitics and the demand for ‘commodity futures contracts’ in the financial markets which 
in turn would influence commodity price. Eliminating top producers from the sample as is 
typically done by these studies may not satisfactorily address these challenges. The difference 
between ours and Berman et al.’s (2017) results perhaps could be explained by the 
heterogeneous effects of discovery and production on conflict as the prospect of future 
production affects conflict onset and incidence less than actual production (Humphreys, 
2005). Nevertheless, we also estimate a model by interacting discoveries with post discovery 
commodity price as a measure of expected discovery value a specification nearest to Berman 
et al. (2017). This result is reported in section 5.6. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses the related 
literature on the causal links between natural resource discovery and conflict. Section 3, 
describes the data and descriptive statistics. Section 4 discusses the empirical strategy to 
identify the effects of natural resource discovery shocks. Section 5 presents evidence and 
discusses the causal mechanism. This section examines the effect of discovery on conflict 
onset, incidence, and intensity separately. It also reports any potential heterogeneous effect 
across resource types (oilfield and minerals), proximity to discovery and national border, size 
of discovery (giant and major), and quality of political institutions. Section 6 deals with 
robustness and section 7 concludes.  
 
2 Why Resource Discovery Might Cause Armed Conflict? 
 
The causal effect of natural resource discoveries on the risk and intensity of intra-state armed 
conflict could be ambiguous (Besley and Persson, 2011). There is a wide range of plausible 
rival mechanisms of the resource-conflict association (Humphreys, 2005). Here we highlight 
a set of mechanisms that could be behind a potential (positive or negative) association 
between natural resource discovery and intra-state armed conflict. 
The Opportunity Cost Mechanism: The opportunity cost mechanism treats conflict as 
an economically important activity. This logic originates from the economic analysis of crime 
literature (Becker, 1968). The hypothesis states that if the returns from conventional 
economic activities such as farming or wage labour are too low then that motivates civilians 
to rebel thereby increasing the likelihood of an armed conflict (Collier and Hoeffler, 1998, 
2004; Miguel et al., 2004). In the event of natural resource discovery both income 
expectations and actual income could rise thereby reducing the likelihood of armed conflict. 
Alternatively, resource extraction could negatively affect the wages of low skilled low 
income households as it is predominantly capital intensive thereby increasing the likelihood 
of conflict (Dal Bo and Dal Bo, 2011). Dube and Vargas (2013) find support for the latter 
mechanism using Colombian data where positive resource price shocks tend to increase 
conflict.  
The State as a Prize Mechanism: Discovering natural resources may increase the prize 
value of state capture and in turn increase the incentive for an armed conflict (Fearon, 2005). 
There are two prominent variants of this argument. The first focuses on the local rebels 
engaging in direct armed conflict against the state to benefit from resource discoveries 
(Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). The second focuses more on the role of geography as rebels 
groups in resource rich regions fight to secede from the state (Humphreys, 2005; Morelli and 
Rohner, 2015). Africa in particular has experienced several episodes of armed secessionist 
movements since independence and some studies observe that resource discoveries play a 
significant role (Fearon, 2005). 
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The Political Patronage Mechanism: The political patronage mechanism stipulates 
that natural resource discovery generates political incentives for incumbents to distribute 
political patronage more widely to survive longer in power (Andersen and Aslaksen, 2013; 
Cuaresma et al., 2010; Robinson et al., 2006). Distribution of patronage to the elites and 
citizens more widely ensures that the incumbent dissuades a militant subset of the society 
from attempting armed rebellion (Francois et al., 2015). Patronage distribution may take the 
form of public sector employment offers, ethnic brokerage, or personal networks that connect 
the co-opted elites in the centre to local citizens (Roessler, 2011). Patronage distribution 
could also influences the voting behaviour of citizens (Robinson et al., 2006). In summary, 
the political patronage mechanism predicts an inverse association between resource discovery 
and armed conflict. 
The State Capacity Mechanism: The state capacity mechanism stipulates that resource 
discovery increases the state's counter insurgency capacity through endowing it with 
additional revenue thereby reducing the likelihood of conflict (Bell and Wolford, 2014; 
Besley and Persson, 2009). Cotet and Tsui (2013a) and Bazzi and Blattman (2014) find 
evidence in support of this mechanism. 
The Credit Constraint Mechanism: Natural resource discovery could relax credit 
constraint for a rebel group making rebellion feasible and easier to sustain. Fearon (2004) and 
Collier et al. (2009) find support in favour of this mechanism. 
The Grievance Mechanism: Resource discovery and subsequent extraction could 
exacerbate grievances from environmental degradation, or limited access to lucrative mining 




Our main objective is to study the effect of natural resource discovery shocks on the risk and 
intensity of intra-state armed conflict in Africa at the subnational grid-cell level. Therefore, 
we divide the whole continent of Africa into a spatial resolution of 0.5 x 0.5 degrees latitude 
and longitude, which approximately amounts to 55 x 55 square kilometres at the equator. In 
order to check robustness of our results, we also analyse the relationship at higher levels of 
aggregation with a spatial resolution of 1 x 1 degrees latitude and longitude. These results are 
discussed in section 5.5. We have data on the specific geographic location of armed conflict 
events, mineral and oilfield discoveries, and local economic activities measured by nighttime 
lights. Our level of geographical aggregation is well matched with the standardized PRIO-
GRID project (Tollefsen et al., 2012), which allows us to merge our natural resource 
discovery dataset with the conflict dataset. Appendix A1 presents a list of countries, table 1 
reports summary statistics, and Appendix A2 presents detailed definition of variables.7 Figure 
1 presents the grid-cell level boundary map of Africa. In what follows is a brief discussion of 
the data. 
 
3.1 Natural Resource Discovery Data 
  
We use two datasets containing the geographical location of natural resource discoveries in 
Africa: MinEx mineral deposits (MinEx Consulting, 2013) and Mike Horn (2011) giant 
oilfield discovery.8 MinEx reports 263 discoveries of 19 minerals over the period 1950 to 
                                                 
7We also check for stationarity of the variables used in the model using Levin-Lin-Chu and Harris-
Tzavalis variety of unit root tests. Both tests account for bias emanating from cross-sectional association. We 
find all variables to be stationary.  
8 Mike Horn identifies whether the field contains oil and/or gas. In the rest of the paper we refer to oil 
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2012.9 They also report the size of the discoveries: major and giant. MinEx codes a mineral 
deposit as giant if it has the capacity to generate at least USD 0.5 billion of annual revenue 
for 20 years or more accounting for fluctuations in commodity prices. A major mineral 
deposit is defined as one that could generate an annual revenue stream of at least USD 50 
million but not as long life as a giant reserve. Mike Horn (2011) reports 59 onshore giant 
oilfield (including condensate) discoveries in Africa over the period 1955 to 2010. Mike Horn 
codes oilfield as giant if it has ultimate recoverable reserves (URR) of at least 500 million 
barrels of oil equivalent. This is equivalent to an annual revenue stream of approximately 
USD 0.4 billion under the assumptions that over the sample period the average gestation lag 
between production and discovery is 5 years, the average price of a barrel is USD 25, and the 
average discount rate including the country specific risk premium is 10 percent.10 Therefore, 
it is reasonable to assume that both the giant oil and mineral discovery shocks are 
approximately of the same size on average. However, it is important to note that the value of 
discoveries are estimates and the projections are reliant on the estimation of the value at the 
time of the discovery. These estimates are often revised in subsequent years. The ultimately 
recoverable deposit could also change if there is a major shift in technology. Therefore, 
discoveries are better treated as exogenous news shocks rather than projection based expected 
revenue shocks.  
Based on this information from both datasets, we construct an indicator whether a grid 
has discovered at least one giant or major natural resource (oil and/or minerals) deposit in a 
given year. We also presents separate estimates for oil and mineral discoveries. Figure 2 
presents a map of oilfield and mineral discovery locations. 
We observe that countries are heterogeneous in terms of the number of discoveries. 
For example, Botswana, Burkina Faso, DRC, Ghana, Mali, Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania 
and Zimbabwe individually represent more than 4% of the total mineral discoveries in the 
continent while other countries feature a lot less on the mineral discovery league table. In the 
oilfield discovery dataset, Libya and Nigeria accounts for 45.8% and 23.7% of the total 
African oilfield discoveries respectively. We also observe that 47.9% of the mineral 
discoveries are gold whereas 78% of the hydrocarbon discoveries are oil.11  
 
3.2 Conflict Data 
 
We use three geocoded datasets of conflict events in Africa: the PRIO-GRID conflict dataset, 
the Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset (ACLED) and the Uppsala Conflict Data 
Program Georeferenced Event Dataset (UCDP GED). These datasets cover different time 
periods. The PRIO-GRID (Version 1.01) presents a long time series, 1946-2008 while the 
ACLED and the UCDP GED (Version 1.5) covers the time period 1997-2012 and 1989-2010 
respectively. The conflict events recorded in these datasets are obtained from various sources 
including press reports, books, historical archives, and databases. 
The temporal PRIO-GRID is a vector grid-cell network with 0.5 x 0.5 degrees. It 
contains cell-specific information on the onset and incidence of armed conflict, represented 
by a conflict ID variable that corresponds to the standard UCDP or PRIO datasets (Tollefsen 
et al., 2012). 
                                                                                                                                                        
and/or gas as oilfield discoveries.  
9 See footnote 3 for a list.  
10 Some studies claim that the risk premium augmented discount rate should be as high as 14-15 
percent. Arezki at al. (2017) presents a more sophisticated analysis of net present value of giant oil discoveries 
and find that the median size of a giant discovery is approximately 5-6 percent of GDP.  
11 These results are reported in long appendix tables A.1 – A.3. 
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Studies show that historical conflict systematically predicts contemporary conflict in 
post-colonial Africa (Besley and Reynal-Querol, 2014). Hence, historical legacy of conflict 
within a grid-cell could contaminate the potential causal relationship between resource 
discovery and conflict. Indeed causality could run in the opposite direction as mining 
companies could avoid exploration in locations with a history of conflict. For this reason, we 
are only interested in the conflict onset variable from the conflict attribute table in PRIO-
GRID. The PRIO-GRID conflict onset is a dummy variable identifying the grid-cells hosting 
the initial battle location for each new intrastate armed conflict. Note that by definition these 
cells host the start of a new conflict and therefore they never had a conflict before. It takes the 
value 1 for the first year of an outbreak with 25 or more fatalities and 0 for all other years. 
According to UCDP and PRIO, an armed conflict is defined as `a contested incompatibility 
between a government and one or more opposition groups that result in at least 25 battle 
deaths in a year' (Gleditsch et al., 2002). 
We also use alternative definitions of armed conflict onset using ACLED and UCDP 
GED. ACLED codes violent political activity within all African states, including dyadic 
interactions between rebels and governments, riots and protests within and outside a civil 
conflict, and violence perpetrated against civilians (Raleigh et al., 2010). However, it does 
not specify a battle related fatalities threshold and conflict events may not adhere to the 
standard UCDP or PRIO definitions. Hence we focus on the ACLED's battle related armed 
conflict definition which was also used by others in the literature.12 Note that ACLED defines 
a battle as ‘a violent interaction between two politically organised armed groups at a 
particular time and location within the context of an armed conflict or civil conflict' (Raleigh 
et al., 2010). 
The UCDP GED dataset codes conflict as 1 if the following two conditions are met: 
(a) at least one fatality; and (b) the relevant actors in the dyad have fought in a battle in which 
at least 25 died at any point in the series. Therefore, UCDP GED dataset contains armed 
conflict events for all actors that surpass the 25 deaths threshold per year at any point in the 
series (Sundberg and Melander, 2013). We use the Bazzi and Blattman (2014) conflict onset 
definition to code onset using the ACLED and UCDP GED datasets. This definition of onset 
is the most widely used in the cross-country literature. It codes onset as 1 when at least one 
conflict event takes place in a country-year that had no event in the prior year (rather than no 
conflict event ever). The stringent ‘no conflict event ever’ definition is applied to conflict 
onset coding using the PRIO-GRID dataset. All peace years are coded as 0 and the years of 
ongoing conflict are coded as missing. 
All three conflict datasets report the precise geographical location of conflict. Hence 
we are able to merge the PRIO-GRID's armed conflict onset to our spatial-temporal grid-cell 
structure. For ACLED and UCDP GED, we aggregate the conflict event data by year and 
grid-cell. Our unit of analysis therefore is a cell-year. Figures 3-5 presents maps of armed 
conflict onset locations from the PRIO-GRID, ACLED, and UCDP GED datasets 
respectively. 
The literature acknowledges that these conflict datasets could over-represent certain 
countries or conflict types and or sub-national regions (Berman and Couttenier, 2015). In 
particular, we observe the following three broad trends. First, the number of grid-cells with 
intra-state armed conflict varies across the three datasets. Second, conflict across countries 
within the African continent is heterogeneously distributed and this distribution varies across 
datasets. Third, the distribution of conflict affected grid-cells within a country also varies 
across datasets. We document these trends in the long Appendix.13 Note that these datasets 
                                                 
12 In some studies ACLED's battle related armed conflict is referred to as organised violence. See for 
example Berman et al. (2017).  
13 See Figures A.1, A.2 and Tables A.4-A.6 in the long appendix for details.  
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have been constructed under different rules and institutions. Therefore, any definitional or 
otherwise traits in them are likely to be idiosyncratic. Since we are finding consistent results 
across three different datasets, it is unlikely that these results are driven by measurement error 
or idiosyncrasies. Furthermore, our very demanding high dimensional fixed effects approach 
also make it unlikely that the results are driven by measurement error and data quality issues. 
 
3.3 Night Lights Data as a Proxy for Local Economic Performance 
 
We do not have measures of income for Africa at the grid-cell level. We use satellite data on 
night lights or luminosity density observed over the period 1992 to 2012 as our proxy for 
income. We acknowledge that using night lights as a proxy has limitations. However, this is 
the best that we could do in the absence of income data to match our spatially and temporally 
detailed conflict and resource discovery data. We calculate luminosity density by dividing the 
sum of all night lights pixel values within a grid by the grid area. We source the night lights 
data from the Defence Meteorological Satellite Program's Operational Linescan System 
(DMSP-OLS). The satellite images of the earth are captured between 20:30 to 22:00 local 
time, and the satellites circle the earth 14 times per day. The data we use here is the cleaned 
luminosity after filtering for cloud coverage, other ephemeral lights, and background noise. 
The measure comes on a scale from 0 to 63 (digital number) calculated for every 30-second 
area (equivalent to 1 square kilometre), where a higher value imply greater night lights 
intensity. 
The distribution of night lights across grids is not normal. We have a significant 
volume of observations that takes the value zero. In order to account for this, we follow 
Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2013) and Hodler and Raschky (2014) and define the 
dependent variable as the natural log of night lights density plus 0.01. It is widely 
acknowledged that such transformation ensures that all available observations are used and 
the problem of outliers minimised. 
The other challenge with night lights data is measurement error. In particular, issues 
relating to the difference between true lights emanating into space and what is recorded by a 
satellite (Henderson et al., 2012). There is also variation in recorded lights data across 
satellites. Measurement error of this nature is unlikely to be a concern here as it is orthogonal 
to our models presented in section 4.2. Furthermore, any cross-satellite variation in night 
lights is already accounted for by the year dummy variable capturing time-varying common 
shocks.14 
 
3.4 Other Grid-Cell Specific Data 
 
We construct grid-cell specific commodity price index variable following the approach of 
Brückner and Ciccone (2010) in the cross-country growth literature. We use the following 
formula. 







                                                               
where ij is grid-cell j’s share of the commodity i in the grid-cell’s total production of the 
commodity in 2000 (or in a year closest to 2000 in case 2000 data is unavailable) and itP  is 
the annual global price series of the commodity i. The mineral production data comes from 
                                                 
14 Note that there is time series variation in satellite data here as different satellites cover different years 
but there is no cross-section variation as all grids in our sample at a particular point in time are covered by the 
same satellite. 
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IntierraRMG and the oil production data comes from Cotet and Tsui (2013a). The production 
data is used to compute production shares of commodities. The price data is extracted from 
the IMF Commodity Prices, United States Geological Survey (USGS) historical commodity 
prices, and Bazzi and Blattman (2014). All prices are normalized to the initial sample period 
as the base year. 
The robustness section includes measures of the distance between grid's centroid and 
the closest national border. We source this data from PRIO-GRID's distance attribute table. 
We also use regional GDP per capita, grid-cell specific total population, and ethnic political 
exclusion from executive state power. All of these variables are sourced from PRIO-GRID. 
Note that the PRIO-GRID itself relies on other datasets such as the geographically based 
economic data (G-Econ) for regional GDP (Nordhaus et al., 2006) and the Ethnic Power 
Relations (EPR) dataset for ethnic political variables (Wucherpfennig et al., 2011).  
Our democracy variable is the Polity2 score. It is based on parameters such as 
executive constraints, competitiveness of political participation, and openness and 
competitiveness of executive recruitment (Marshall et al., 2014). 
 
4 Empirical Strategy 
 
4.1 Resource Discovery and Local Armed Conflict  
 
We use a panel dataset covering more than 10000 grids from 48 African countries.15 The 
grids are constructed using ArcGIS. To analyse the local effects of resource discovery on 
conflict, we estimate the following model:  
 
              , , , 1 , 2 , ,g t j g t g t i t g t g t g tConf Discov Past Discov                                      (1) 
 
where ,g t jConf  is the outcome variable that captures conflict onset, conflict incidence, and 
conflict intensity in cell g at year t . The variable ,g tDiscov is an indicator of resource 
discovery in cell g at year t . ,g tPast Discov is the number of years with resource discoveries 
in the last ten years (from t - 10 to t - 1). Note that ,g tPast Discov accounts for the history of 
discovery news shock in that cell. It is coded to take the value {1(1)10}N  for a particular 
cell-year if that grid-cell had N discovery years over the past 10 years. The 10 year window is 
based on Lei and Michaels (2014). Our results are not sensitive to the inclusion or exclusion 
of past discoveries and or alternative definitions of past discoveries. We estimate this model 
for different leads j, where in most cases {0,2,4,6,8,10}j . 
As discussed earlier, our main dependent variable is armed conflict onset from PRIO-
GRID. It is a rare event with 84 instances of battles with more than 25 fatalities. This 
definition of conflict onset could be viewed as overly restrictive even though it does very 
well in addressing endogeneity issues. Therefore we also use the Bazzi and Blattman (2014) 
definition of conflict onset for ACLED and UCDP GED datasets. There are 3473 conflict 
onset events in ACLED, and 3272 onset events in UCDP GED.  
We also estimate the effect of resource discovery on conflict incidence, conflict 
intensity and conflict ending. Conflict incidence is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 
for cell-years when there is an intrastate armed conflict with more than 25 fatalities. Conflict 
                                                 
15 Due to data limitations, our sample period varies from specification to specification depending on the 
conflict dataset: PRIO-GRID (1950-2008), ACLED (1997-2012) and UCDP GED (1989-2010). In most 
specifications, the panel is unbalanced. Appendix A1 presents a list of countries included in the sample. 
 12 
intensity is measured by the number of conflict events observed in a cell-year. Conflict 
ending codes all years of ongoing conflict as 0 and the year of ending as 1 using UCDP-GED 
and ACLED datasets (Bazzi and Blattman, 2014). Even though widely used in some circles, 
conflict incidence and intensity measures are criticised because of the lack of uniformity in 
their definitions (Sambanis, 2004). Fearon (2011) and Ciccone (2011) argue that both conflict 
incidence and intensity are aggregate measures of onset and persistence. Conflict onset and 
its continuation are disparate outcome variables potentially driven by widely different factors. 
Hence, there is very little logic in combining the two and assuming that resource discovery 
would affect them in the same way. Following some notable recent studies (Ciccone, 2011; 
Cotet and Tsui, 2013a) we use the terms `armed conflict' and `civil conflict' interchangeably. 
Our main coefficient of interest here is 1  which presents the effect of resource 
discovery on conflict. If African conflicts are natural resource driven then we would expect 
1  to be positive and statistically significant. Any indication otherwise would serve as a 
refutation of the view that resource discovery triggers conflict in Africa. 
In all specifications, we control for high dimension fixed effects: grid-cell fixed 
effects g , year dummies t , grid-cell specific time trend ,g t and countrywide time-varying 
characteristics ,i t . Grid-cell fixed effects account for geological characteristics, altitude and 
ruggedness, proximity to the ports and cities, and ethnic characteristics. It also captures 
potential time invariant systematic differences across cells affecting conflict data recording 
and reporting. Year fixed effects account for global shocks such as a spike in minerals or oil 
price. Grid-cell specific time trend accounts for external shocks such as a cell specific 
weather event. The country x year fixed effects account for factors such as property rights 
protection, exploration effort, defence burden or military expenditure as a share of GDP, 
national political dynamics including elections, and national regulations regarding resource 
exploration and other institutions.  
Our identification strategy is a treatment-control procedure that uses the discovery 
news shock as the treatment and compares it to cells with no discoveries. It relies on the 
assumptions that the effect of the discovery news shock differs with discovery status, and the 
evolution of armed conflict is otherwise common in all cells.  
In all estimations, we use robust standard errors clustered at the country level. We 
also use the Driscoll-Kraay standard errors (Driscoll and Kraay, 1998) which is derived from 
a non-parametric heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent estimator of the variance-
covariance matrix.16 In addition we check the robustness of our results using default standard 
errors, standard errors clustered at different spatial levels including cells and regions, and 
standard errors that allow for both cross-sectional spatial correlation and grid-specific serial 
correlation (or Conley standard errors) (Conley, 1999; Conley and Molinari, 2007). 
Is the discovery news shock an appropriate identifier here? First, major and giant 
discovery news shocks signal significant increases in future economic rent and therefore 
suitably captures the economic motivation of a conflict. Second, in all likelihood the timing 
of a giant or major natural resource discovery is exogenous because of its unexpected nature. 
However, natural resource discoveries in the recent past could raise the likelihood of 
additional discoveries in the immediate future. This does not appear to be the case within a 
cell. In table 2 we find a positive correlation between past and future discoveries in pooled 
OLS models (see columns 1, 3, and 5), but the correlation reverses within a cell when we 
control for high dimension fixed effects (see columns 2, 4, and 6). This is not surprising 
                                                 
16 The Driscoll-Kraay standard errors are an extension of the common non-parametric variance-
covariance matrix estimation techniques robust to the very general forms of spatial and temporal dependence 
(Cameron and Miller, 2015; Hoechle, 2007). 
 13 
given that a cell is much smaller than a region or a country.17 In Table 3 we further check 
exogeneity of resource discovery by correlating it with past economic and political factors 
(Lei and Michaels, 2014). We observe that a cell's average economic performance, political 
institutions, and conflict intensity over the preceding years is not a robust predictor of 
resource discovery. They also appear to be jointly insignificant with a p-value = 0.4 (see 
column 7, table 3). This is suggestive that giant and major resource discoveries are indeed 
orthogonal. Figure 6 also supports the exogeneity view as we notice that the timing of 
discovery is not tracked by commodity price and African GDP per capita. Third, discovery 
date signifies a clear start of the experiment which allows us to track the intertemporal effects 
of discovery, construction, and production. Therefore, we are able to distinguish between 
expectation induced and actual revenue induced effects. 
Exploration effort which leads to successful discoveries could be influenced by pre-
existing conflict and property rights institutions. Note that there are no grid-cell level 
exploration expenditure or effort data. Hence, we use political exclusion of a grid-specific 
ethnic group from state power as a measure of grid-cell level property rights institutions. 
Section 5.1 presents more discussion on this. 
 
4.2 Causal Mechanisms  
 
What is the mechanism through which resource discovery affects conflict? The literature 
offers several explanations some of which we have reviewed in section 2. Our data allows us 
to test the income and patronage mechanisms. The former postulates that resource discovery 
and extraction increases citizens’ income and general wellbeing thereby reducing the 
likelihood of conflict. The latter postulates that resource discovery provides additional 
resources to incumbents which then they could use for patronage distribution. Patronage 
distribution reduces the likelihood of conflict. 
First, we estimate the following specification to test the link between resource 
discovery and local income measured by night lights. If resource discovery improves local 
income then we would expect 1  to be positive and significant. 
 
        , , , 1 , 2 , ,g t j g t g t i t g t g t g tLuminosity Discov Past Discov                                  (2) 
 
Second, using the following model we test the link between this improved income and armed 
conflict onset.  
 
, , , 1 , 2 3 , ,,g t j g t g t i t g t g t g tg t j
Conf Discov Luminosity Past Discov                      (3) 
 
If resource discovery affects conflict exclusively via the income channel then we would 
expect 2 to be significant and 1 to be insignificant. For 2 to be a causal estimate the 
following identifying assumptions need to be satisfied. The composite error term in equation 
(3) after incorporating the predicted values of equation (2) should have zero mean and should 
be uncorrelated with all the explanatory variables. Even though there is no direct way of 
testing these assumptions, the presence of the high dimension fixed effects make it likely that 
these assumptions are satisfied. However, we cannot be certain that this is indeed the case. At 
the very least this strategy offers correlation that is informative. 
Luminosity data has been used widely as a proxy for local economic development 
                                                 
17 Region and country level results are reported in the long appendix (Tables A.7 - A.8). The country 
level result is consistent with Lei and Michaels (2014). 
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which we use here (Henderson et al., 2012; Hodler and Raschky, 2014; Michalopoulos and 
Papaioannou, 2013, Mamo et al., 2019).18 
5 Evidence 
 
5.1 Resource Discovery and Conflict: Onset, Incidence, Intensity and Ending  
 
In this section we report the main empirical results. In tables 4 and 5 we investigate the 
association between resource discovery and the PRIO-GRID conflict onset variable. Table 4 
reports the standard pooled OLS regressions. The estimate of 1  is negative and significant 
indicating that resource discovery reduces the probability of conflict onset in a between-cell 
time-series setting. The size of the effect is small: a point estimate of 0.0001. The negative 
effect appears to be stable across resource type (see Panels B and C). It is also persistent over 
time as it survives 10 years after discovery. 
In table 5 we focus on within cell effects by controlling for high dimension fixed 
effects. The estimate of 1  is negative and insignificant. To what extent the negative 
correlation between past conflict intensity and discovery could drive these effects. If we are 
to assume the insignificant coefficient of -0.00031 in table 3 column 6 to be significant then 
its lower bound from the 95% confidence interval would be -0.000898. If we suppose that the 
degree of correlation between past conflict and discovery is given by this lower bound -
0.000898 then it would increase the conflict onset probability within a cell by 0.000003. As is 
apparent, this would not be enough to reduce any of the reported coefficients in table 5, panel 
A, columns 1-6 to zero.  
Note that, the individual effects of oilfield and mineral discoveries within a cell 
remain negative but insignificant (see Panels B and C). Figure 7 displays a non-parametric 
local polynomial regression of resource discovery on conflict onset conditioned on the high 
dimension fixed effects. Even though not always statistically significant, the figure 
demonstrate a decline in the likelihood of conflict onset post discovery. Oilfield and mineral 
discoveries follow a very similar trajectory.  
We address identification challenges by introducing resource discovery news shocks. 
An alternative argument could be that these shocks are not random as they are dependent on 
exploration effort and property rights protection. In table 6 we estimate the same model as in 
table 5 but after controlling for property rights institutions at the grid-cell level. It is difficult 
to find direct measures of property rights at the grid-cell level. We use political exclusion of 
the dominant ethnic group in a particular grid-cell from the state executive as a proxy 
measure of property rights institutions. The key assumption here is that political exclusion 
would lead to higher expropriation risk for private and state property. This measure is 
sourced from PRIO-GRID or Tollefsen et al. (2012). Note that the sample size reduces 
significantly due to missing data for the political exclusion variable. The result hardly 
changes from table 5. In fact, the negative coefficients on oil discovery in panel B now 
becomes statistically significant. 
Nevertheless, we also perform two additional checks with the data that we have. We 
test the effects of ‘first discovery’ shocks and ‘single first discovery’ shocks. The former are 
cells which did not have a discovery before and the latter are cells which had only one 
discovery over the sample period. Note that we distinguish between ‘minerals + oilfield’, 
‘minerals’, and ‘oilfield’. ‘Minerals’ include major and giant discoveries whereas ‘oilfield’ 
                                                 
18 Night lights data could be reflecting changing population density. We therefore control for changing 
population density and our result remains robust. We also find no evidence of population surge following a 
resource discovery at the grid level. This result is independent of grid size (1 x 1 degree) or higher levels of 
aggregation (region level). See section 5.5. 
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covers giant discoveries only. These are rare events. In particular, ‘single first giant oilfield or 
mineral discoveries’ are extremely rare. Therefore it is reasonable to expect that they are 
orthogonal to the quality of property rights institutions at the cell level. In both cases we do 
not find any effect on conflict onset using all three datasets. These results are reported in 
table 7.19  
In tables 8 and 9 we use conflict onset from the UCDP GED and ACLED datasets 
respectively and find that the negative and insignificant result is not unique to PRIO-GRID. 
This is reassuring and we can be reasonably confident that our result of 'no conflict resource 
curse' in Africa is not noisy. 
Factors triggering a conflict could be different from factors motivating the 
continuation of a conflict. Therefore, we also analyse the effect of discovery on conflict 
incidence and intensity using data from UCDP GED and ACLED. However, incidence and 
intensity are not as clean measure of conflict as onset. This is because onset flags the start of 
a conflict whereas incidence and intensity are aggregate measures of both start and 
persistence. This confounds causality issues as pre-existing conflict could influence the 
unobservable exploration effort prior to the actual resource discovery. Nevertheless, we 
estimate these models and find that the negative and insignificant result remains unaltered.20 
Coding ‘conflict offset’ or ‘conflict ending’ separately similar to Bazzi and Blattman 
(2014) arguably offer a better test of conflict persistence than conflict incidence (which is a 
combination of onset and persistence). If we code ‘conflict ending’ separately then we do not 
find any effect of resource discovery as all coefficients are statistically insignificant.  
 
5.2 Testing the Mechanisms  
 
Theory predicts that natural resources could affect conflict through multiple channels. It is 
however difficult to establish these causal channels empirically. It is even more difficult for 
Africa due to the lack of data. Using satellite data on night lights (Henderson et al., 2012), we 
are at least able to indirectly test the income channel. Resource discovery could impact on the 
local living standards and influence the likelihood of a conflict. 
We use natural logarithm of night lights density as a proxy for local living standards. 
This however restricts our sample to 1992 to 2012. In table 10, we find that resource 
discovery improves lights density after controlling for past discoveries and high dimension 
fixed effects. The early positive effect of the news shock is perhaps expectation induced. 
Discovery news shock could typically increase expectations of future economic activity 
which could induce demand driven expansion of the local economy. However, the expansion 
becomes stronger and strongly significant 4-6 years after discovery when construction and 
production starts. The effect remains strong 10 years after the discovery indicating strong 
positive effect of resource revenue during the production stage. This result is consistent with 
the findings of (Mamo et al., 2019)21 and Cotet and Tsui (2013b). The latter finds oil 
discoveries improve economic and health outcomes using cross-country data. 
                                                 
19 Long appendix tables A9 and A10 report first and single first discovery results with ACLED and 
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conflict RD     

      where ,j t iRD   is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a discovery 
has been made in the year t i  in a particular grid-cell and 0 if no discovery has been made and missing for all 
years beyond 10 years after discovery. 
20 These results are reported in the long appendix (tables A.11-A.14). 
21 The effect of resource discoveries on night lights could be driven by the lights emanating from the 
extractive industries themselves. Therefore, we ignore all lights around an arbitrary 2-5 kilometre radius of an 
oilfield or mine. Results reported in the long appendix remain unchanged. 
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In table 11 we explore whether the resource discovery driven improvement in living 
standards has any impact on conflict onset.22 In columns 1-6 we find that indeed higher local 
living standards (measured by night lights) reduce conflict onset after controlling for 
population density, past discovery and high dimensional fixed effects. We test whether the 
effect of resource discovery works exclusively through improvements in local living 
standards. The coefficient on resource discovery is consistently negative and significant in 
few cases which suggests that there is a direct effect of discovery on conflict over and above 
the indirect effect via the income channel. The direct effect could be reflective of the changes 
in expectations. The local population could expect higher future income after a discovery and 
this could reduce conflict. Our evidence appears to be qualitatively consistent with Bazzi and 
Blattman (2014) and Berman and Couttenier (2015). 
To what extent the negative and insignificant effect of resource discovery on conflict 
works via the political patronage and or the military expenditure mechanisms in Africa? It is 
worthwhile noting that military expenditure represents state capacity towards repression and 
counterinsurgency. Alternatively, it could also represent a government response to escalating 
civil unrest. Figure 8(a) plots the nonparametric relationship between resource discovery and 
the number of cabinet posts. There is a positive relationship perhaps suggesting an increase in 
political patronage and hence a decline in conflict via the patronage mechanism.23 However, 
our data does not appear to be supportive of the state capacity mechanism as in figure 8(b) we 
observe military expenditure as a share of GDP to moderately decline with discoveries. This 
is contrary to the cross-country results of Cotet and Tsui (2013a) where they report oil wealth 
increases defence burden as the state faces more violent challenges. Regressions 
corresponding to figure 8 is reported in table 12. 
 
5.3 Heterogeneous Effects of Discovery Size and Distance  
 
Giant discoveries are significantly larger than major discoveries. Therefore they should have 
a bigger effect on conflict due to their superior economic value. Furthermore, they also enter 
production more quickly.24 Note that 64 percent of all mineral discoveries in our dataset are 
major while all the oil discoveries are giant. In table 13 we find that the negative and 
insignificant result is not affected by the size of discovery. 
Another potential heterogeneity could arise from the proximity of a conflict to a 
discovered oilfield or a mine. One would expect armed conflicts to occur in faraway locations 
rather than in close proximity to a discovery. We calculate the time-varying distance to the 
nearest oilfield or mineral discoveries from the centroid of each grid (expressed in 
kilometres) and regress it on conflict onset after controlling for high dimension fixed effects. 
Distance does not seem to influence the negative and insignificant relationship between 
discovery and conflict onset irrespective of the dataset (PRIO-GRID, UCDP GED, or 
ACLED) used to define onset.  
Finally, proximity to the border could also be a factor (Caselli et al., 2017). If 
resource discoveries are close to the border and two countries happen to have border disputes 
then we could very well be picking up the impact of the latter rather than the former. Border 
disputes between two countries often diffuse and morph into civil wars. Caselli et al. (2017) 
reports that the presence of natural resource endowments on the border are significant 
                                                 
22 Note that we are using UCDP GED conflict events here as the sample period matches more with 
night lights data. Results are similar with PRIO-GRID. 
23 This is consistent with the theoretical predictions of Robinson et al. (2006) and empirical evidence of 
Roessler (2011). 
24 Figure A.3 in the long appendix presents Kaplan Meier probability estimates for giant and major 
deposits entering production which attests to this point. 
 17 
predictors of inter-state conflict. Therefore, we calculate the distance to national borders and 
divide the sample of grid-cells into 4 groups according to their distance to the border: less 
than 25 km, between 25-50 km, between 50-100 km, and greater than 100 km. We estimate 
equation 1 for each of these samples and three different datasets and the negative and 
insignificant result survives suggesting that proximity to the border (or conflict propensity) is 
not a factor here.25 
 
5.4 The Effects of Institutions  
 
To what extent institutional quality influence the relationship between natural resources and 
conflict (Arezki and Gylfason, 2013)? Representative political institutions could increase 
legitimacy of the incumbent government and diffuse tensions. Therefore, one would expect 
democratic institutions to reduce negative consequences of natural resources on conflict. 
Alternatively, resource discoveries could reduce conflict in autocracies as they invest more 
into repression (Cotet and Tsui, 2013a). We test the link in table 14 using Polity 2 as a 
measure of institutional quality. We do not find any effect of institutions on the relationship 
between mineral discovery and conflict onset (Panel C). However, we find that oilfield 
discoveries lead to less intra-state conflict onset and that the negative effect is magnified in 
countries with good institutions. 
 
5.5 Higher Levels of Aggregation: Grid Cells, Regions and Countries  
 
Resource discovery in one cell could trigger conflict elsewhere in the neighbouring cell, 
region or country. Therefore, a grid-cell level analysis may not be fully informative here. 
Hence, we estimate the model using higher grid-cell resolution, region-year and country-year 
as units of analysis. Although determining the optimal level of aggregation is not 
straightforward, our aggregation procedure is twofold: systematic grouping (region and 
country level) and random grouping (higher level grid-cell demarcation).26  
We undertake the following three steps. First, we aggregate the conflict events and 
resource discoveries at higher grids-cells (1x1 degrees latitude and longitude, which is 
equivalent to 111x111 square kilometres at the equator) and estimate the main model. The 
effect of discovery on conflict onset remains statistically insignificant and negative in most 
cases.27 Second, in table 15 we report the region level results. We find resource discovery 
significantly reduces conflict onset after controlling for year fixed effects, region fixed 
effects, region-specific time trend and country x year fixed effects. Third, in table 16 we 
estimate the relationship at the country level.28 This result is comparable to recent cross-
country studies by Cotet and Tsui (2013a) and Lei and Michaels (2014). Unlike these studies 
which solely focus on the effects of oilfield discovery, we are able to consider both oil and 
minerals. We find that oil and mineral discoveries have no discernible effect on conflict onset 
at the national level after controlling for fixed effects and country specific trends. Estimating 
the model separately for oil and minerals do not alter our results. The country level results 
confirm the findings of Cotet and Tsui (2013a). It is worthwhile noting that we do not find 
any evidence of the ecological inference fallacy here. 
                                                 
25 These results are reported in tables A.15-A.20 in the long appendix. 
26 It is worthwhile noting that a key limitation with higher level aggregation is the phenomenon known 
as ecological inference fallacy (Maystadt et al., 2013). The association between resource discoveries and armed 
conflict may differ in magnitude and signs across different levels of aggregation. 
27 These results are reported in long appendix tables A.21-A.23. 
28 Region and country level results with ACLED and UCDP-GED datasets are reported in Long 
Appendix tables A.24 - A.27. 
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5.6 The Value of Discovery and Conflict  
 
Berman et al. (2017) show that the value of deposits positively affect conflict. They measure 
the value of deposits by interacting production volume of a deposit with commodity price. In 
table 17 we follow the Berman et al. (2017) specification closely and interact commodity 
price with a discovery dummy variable. The discovery dummy variable here takes the value 
zero before discovery and one after discovery. Therefore the interaction with commodity 
price could be interpreted as the fluctuation in the value of the discovery due to commodity 
price movements after discovery. Note that the commodity price variable is described in 
section 3.4 and the dependent variable is conflict onset. The negative and largely insignificant 
result remains unaffected across all three datasets (PRIO-GRID, UCDP-GED, ACLED). 
 
6 Robustness and Sensitivity Analysis 
 
We conduct a battery of robustness tests and sensitivity analysis. These results are reported in 
the long appendix tables A.28 to A. 43 to save space.  
A contentious issue relates to pooling grid-cells with at least one resource discovery 
with others. Some argue that grid-cells with resource discoveries are fundamentally different 
from others in ways that cannot be measured or controlled for directly (Lei and Michaels, 
2014). Therefore pooling all grid-cells would constitute a violation of the common trend 
assumption. This is less of a threat here given our high dimension fixed effects. Nevertheless, 
we restrict the sample to observations where at least one resource discovery was made during 
the sample period and the negative and largely insignificant result survives.  
Similarly we restrict our sample to grid-cells with at least one conflict event during 
the sample period. Berman and Couttenier (2015) refer to such grid-cells as ‘high conflict 
risk’. In fact the negative effect of resource discovery becomes bigger and statistically 
significant. 
Some resource discoveries may cross grid-cell boundaries and take up large 
geographies thereby influencing conflict location. Therefore, we employ buffer zone analysis. 
We do this by creating a bigger zone (with varying Euclidean distance) around the resource 
discovery geo-coordinates and estimate the model. The main results remain unaffected. 
Finally, we employ both logit and Poisson estimators. The logit model estimates the 
effect of discoveries on conflict onset and incidence whereas the Poisson model estimates the 
effect on count data variable such as conflict intensity. We observe strong negative effect of 
resource discovery on conflict.  
Note that there are obvious challenges with employing non-linear (e.g., logit and 
Poisson) estimators in models with high dimension fixed effects. These challenges could be 
theoretical as well as computational. The relevant likelihood functions here converge only 
with country x year fixed effects. Bazzi and Blattman (2014) also report similar issues with 
their logit estimator. With country x year fixed effects the model perhaps do not do as good 
as equation (1) in terms of identification. However, it is perhaps reasonable to assume that it 




Africa is often viewed as a prime location for natural resource driven conflict. The volume of 
research on this topic is sizeable. Yet establishing causality remains a challenge. In this paper 
we are able to set up a natural experiment to study the effect of natural resources on conflict 
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at the grid-cell level covering the period 1950 to 2008. Note that cells here correspond to a 
spatial resolution of 0.5 x 0.5 degrees latitude and longitudes (approximately 55 x 55 square 
kilometres at the equator). Using giant and major resource discovery dates as an exogenous 
news shock we find no evidence that natural resources trigger conflict in Africa. In particular, 
resource discovery significantly reduce the likelihood of conflict onset within 10 years post 
resource discovery in a pooled cross-section model. The effect becomes insignificant once we 
control for high dimension fixed effects. This broad pattern in the data holds with both 
conflict incidence, intensity and ending as dependent variables. 
We also explore the mechanism through which discovery could affect conflict. 
Resource discovery appears to influence conflict indirectly via improved local living 
standards and directly via improved expectations of high future income. We find support for 
another conflict reducing mechanism through the distribution of political patronage by the 
state. In particular, resource discovery appears to increase the number of cabinet ministerial 
positions thereby reducing the likelihood of conflict.  
A common argument is that the relationship between natural resources and conflict is 
national rather than local. Therefore, cell level analysis may not be appropriate here. Hence, 
we also test the relationship at higher grid-cell resolution, and regional and national levels. 
Our main result remains unaffected. There is little or no heterogeneity in the relationship 
between resource discovery and conflict across resource type, size of discovery, distance to 
discovery, distance to the national border, and institutional quality. 
Our study presents new evidence in a literature where a significant number of earlier 
studies reported a positive relationship between natural resources and conflict. The difference 
in results perhaps stems from the following factors. First, heterogeneity in the data generating 
process could be a factor. Resource (oil and minerals) discovery is different from some of the 
variables used in the earlier literature (for example, resource extraction, primary exports, 
resource rent, value of deposits, and oil discovery). Furthermore, the definition of conflict 
varies significantly across studies also demonstrating heterogeneity. Second, it could also be 
due to the heterogeneity in the data frequency and unit of assessment. Majority of the earlier 
studies used cross-country data.  
In spite of her colonial and post-colonial history as a supplier of raw materials, a vast 
majority of African natural wealth remains untapped (Collier, 2010). These resources are 
expected to be exploited over the coming two to three decades amid increasing global 
demand for raw materials. The expected steady depletion of natural resources and the 
favourable global commodity prices presents Africa with an opportunity to harness this 
wealth for improving state capacity and living standards. Our research suggests that both of 

















A1. List of Countries 
Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African 
Republic, Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Cote d'Ivorie, Egypt, Equatorial 
Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, 
Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, 
Niger, Nigeria, Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, 
Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
 
A2. Data Appendix 
PRIO-GRID Conflict Onset: A dummy variable identifying the grid-cell hosting the first 
recorded battle location for each intrastate armed conflict with > 25 battle deaths. Source: 
Tollefsen et al. (2012). 
UCDP GED Conflict Onset: The first year of outbreak with 25 or more fatalities take the 
value 1, all peace years equal 0, and years of ongoing conflict are coded as missing. Source: 
Sundberg and Melander (2013). 
UCDP GED Conflict Incidence: A dummy variable equals one if at least one intrastate 
armed conflict with > 25 battle deaths happened in the grid-year. Source: Sundberg and 
Melander (2013). 
UCDP GED Conflict Intensity: The number of intrastate armed conflict events with > 25 
battle deaths observed in the grid-year. Source: Sundberg and Melander (2013). 
ACLED Conflict Onset: The first year of battle related conflict outbreak take the value 1, all 
peace years equal 0, and years of ongoing conflict are coded as missing. Source: Raleigh et 
al. (2010). 
ACLED Conflict Incidence: A dummy variable equals one if at least one intrastate battle 
related armed conflict happened in the grid-year. Source: Raleigh et al. (2010). 
ACLED Conflict Intensity: The number of intrastate battle related armed conflict events 
observed in the grid-year. Source: Raleigh et al. (2010). 
Natural Resource Discovery: A dummy variable taking the value one for at least one 
discovery of natural resources (giant or major oil/ mineral reserves) in a grid-year. Source: 
MinEx Consulting (2013) and Mike Horn (2011). 
Oilfield Discovery: A dummy variable taking the value one for at least one discovery of a 
giant oil reserve in a grid-year. See section 3 for the definition of giant oil reserve. Source: 
Mike Horn (2011). 
Mineral Discovery: A dummy variable taking the value one for at least one discovery of a 
giant or major mineral reserve in a grid-year. See section 3 for the definition of giant and 
major mineral reserve and footnote 3 for a list of minerals included in the dataset. Source: 
MinEx Consulting (2013). 
Past Discoveries: It is the history of discovery news shock in that grid, coded to take the 
value {1(1)10}N  for a particular grid-year if that grid had N discovery years over the past 
10 years. Source: MinEx Consulting (2013) and Mike Horn (2011). 
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Democracy: Democracy measured by the Polity2 score, which is based on executive 
constraints, the competitiveness of political participation, and the openness and 
competitiveness of executive recruitment. Source: Marshall et al. (2014). 
Distance to the Border: Distance (in kilometers) from the grid cell centroid to the border of 
the nearest neighbouring country, regardless of whether the nearest country is located across 
international waters. Source: Tollefsen et al. (2012). 
Distance to the National Capital: Distance (in kilometers) from the grid cell centroid to the 
national capital. Source: Tollefsen et al. (2012). 
Travel Time to the Nearest Urban Centre: Estimated cell-average travel time (in minutes) 
by land transportation from the cell to the nearest major city with more than 50,000 
inhabitants. Travel time is time invariant. Source: Tollefsen et al. (2012). 
Ethnic Level Characteristics: Contains information of the identity of spatially defined, 
politically relevant ethnic groups settled in the grid cell. The covariates include ethnic total 
population and their inclusion and exclusion from executive state power. It also include the 
regional per capita GDP from G-Econ dataset. Source: Tollefsen et al. (2012). 
Grid-cell Level Commodity Price: See section 3.4 for details. Source: Authors calculation 
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Figure 1: Grid Cell Level Boundary Map of Africa 
 
Notes: This boundary map is the grid-cell level subnational division of Africa. The cell has a spatial resolution 






Figure 2: Oilfield and Mineral Discovery Locations 
 
























Figure 4: ACLED Armed Conflict Locations 
 
 















Figure 5: UCDP GED Armed Conflict Locations 
 
 





Figure 6: Discoveries, Commodity Price and GDP per capita in Africa over the period 1950-
2010: Is There Co-movement? 
 
 
A: Natural Resource Discovery 
 
 
B: Commodity Price Index 
 
 
C: GDP Per Capita 
 
Notes: The figures show the annual evolution of the number of discoveries, GDP per capita and international 
commodity price index in Africa over the period 1950-2010. 
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Figure 7: Resource Discovery and Conflict Onset: Predicted Values 
 
 
A: Natural Resource: Oilfield and Minerals 
 
 
B: Oilfield Discovery 
 
 
C: Mineral Discovery 
 
Notes: These figures are plotted using the nonparametric local polynomial regression method with 
Epanechnikov kernel. The bar displays smoothed values with 95% confidence intervals. The nonparametric 
regression is conditional on past discovery, year fixed effects, grid-cell fixed effects, grid-cell specific time 
trends, and country x year fixed effects. We predict the value of conflict onset for a given discovery in a panel of 

















Figure 8: Cabinet Size, Military Expenditure and Resource Discovery in Africa 
 
 
(a) Cabinet Size and Resource Discovery 
 
 
(b) Military Expenditure and Resource Discovery 
 
Notes: The graph shows the association between government cabinet size (the number of cabinet positions), 
military expenditure and natural resource discovery. It uses nonparametric lpoly estimators of government 
cabinet size and military expenditure as functions of resource discoveries, pooled across all countries. These are 
country level analyses. Figures (a) and (b) are Kernel-weighted local polynomial smoothing and are free of 
parametric assumptions. ‘Number of Cabinet Ministers (Residuals)’ imply residual variation in the number of 
cabinet ministers after subtracting the country-specific arithmetic mean. ‘Military Expenditure (Residuals)’ 
imply residual variation in military expenditure after subtracting the country-specific arithmetic mean. Resource 























Table 1: Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. First Year Last Year 
Year Year Discovery of Oilfield and Mineral Resources 
Resource discovery indicator 646191 0.0004 0.0211 1950 2012 
Years with res. disc. (t-10 to t-1) 646191 0.0038 0.0679 1950 2012 
Oilfield discovery indicator 646191 0.0001 0.0089 1950 2012 
Years with oil disc. (t-10 to t-1) 646191 0.0008 0.0311 1950 2012 
Mineral discovery indicator 646191 0.0003 0.0192 1950 2012 
Years with min. disc. (t-10 to t-1) 646191 0.0030 0.0604 1950 2012 
PRIO-GRID Conflict Dataset 
Conflict onset indicator 646191 0.0001 0.0114 1946 2008 
UCDP GED Conflict Dataset 
Conflict onset indicator 232208 0.014 0.118 1989 2010 
Conflict incidence indicator 235246 0.027 0.161 1989 2010 
Conflict intensity 235246 0.032 0.222 1989 2010 
ACLED Conflict Dataset 
Conflict onset indicator 168499 0.021 0.142 1997 2012 
Conflict incidence indicator 171088 0.035 0.185 1997 2012 
Conflict intensity 171088 0.043 0.262 1997 2012 
Democracy Variables 
Polity2 640395 -3.336 3.476 1950 2008 
Resource discovery * Polity2 640395 -0.0005 0.105 1950 2008 
Oilfield discovery * Polity2 640395 -0.0004 0.053 1950 2008 
Mineral discovery * Polity2 640395 -0.0001 0.091 1950 2008 
Additional Covariates: Grid Level Characteristics 
Area of the grid cell (sq. km) 646191 7.921 0.436 1946 2008 
Distance to the border (km) 632646 4.679 1.137 1946 2008 
Political Exclusion 284494 0.477 0.499 1946 2008 
Notes: This table reports summary statistics for the main variables and other cell level additional covariates. See 







Table 2: Past Discoveries and Near Future Discoveries 
Dependent Variable: Natural Resource 
Discovery 













Past Discovery 0.0144*** -0.0073*** 0.0111*** -0.0069*** 0.0154*** -0.0074*** 
 (0.003) (0.0021) (0.005) (0.0014) (0.003) (0.0026) 
Year Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Cell Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Cell-Specific Time Trend No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Country x Year Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 646191 646191 646191 646191 646191 646191 
Sample Period 1950-2012 1950-2012 1950-2012 1950-2012 1950-2012 1950-2012 
Notes: This table reports whether discoveries in a grid’s recent past raise the odds of additional discoveries in its 
near future. The explanatory variable (past discovery) is the number of years with discoveries from t-10 to t-1. 
Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered at the country level. ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 3: Is Natural Resource Discovery Random? 
Dependent Variable: Indicator of Natural Resource Discovery 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Per Capita GDP -0.0003      -0.0002 
 (0.0002)      (0.0002) 
Population Share  0.0014     0.0014 
  (0.0014)     (0.0023) 
Population Size   0.0015    0.0005 
   (0.0011)    (0.0017) 
Political Representation    -0.00014   0.0015 
    (0.0005)   (0.0010) 
Political Exclusion     0.0005  0.0017 
     (0.0003)  (0.0013) 
Past Conflict Intensity      -0.00031 -0.00015 
      (0.0003) (0.0002) 
Past Discovery -0.0121*** -0.0119*** -0.0121*** -0.0122*** -0.0122*** -0.01256*** -0.01289*** 
 (0.0031) (0.0030) (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.004) (0.004 
Year Fixed Effects Ye
s 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cell Fixed Effects Ye
s 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cell-Specific Time Trend Ye
s 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country x Year Fixed Effects Ye
s 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 249951 255754 250389 252889 252889 255,754 246,419 
Sample Period 1950-2008 1950-2008 1950-2008 1950-2008 1950-2008 1950-2008 1950-2008 
Notes: This table reports whether the timing of natural resource discoveries is correlated with the mean of cell’s 
economic and political variables in the past years. Past discovery is the number of years with discoveries from t-
10 to t-1. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered at the country level. ***, **, and * 














Table 4: Resource Discovery and Civil Conflict Onset: Between-Cell Effects 






t + 2 
(3) 
t + 4 
(4) 
t + 6 
(5) 
t + 8 
(6) 
t + 10 
Panel A: Effect of Discovering Natural Resource (Oilfield + Minerals) 
Discovery -0.00011*** -0.00012*** -0.00012*** -0.00013*** -0.00013*** -0.00014*** 
 (0.000021) (0.000021) (0.000023) (0.000024) (0.000025) (0.000026) 
Past Discovery -0.00011*** -0.00011*** -0.00011*** -0.00012*** -0.00012*** -0.00012*** 
 (0.000021) (0.000021) (0.000022) (0.000023) (0.000023) (0.000024) 
Panel B: Effect of Discovering Oilfield 
Discovery -0.00011*** -0.00012*** -0.00012*** -0.00013*** -0.00013*** -0.00014*** 
 (0.000021) (0.000022) (0.000023) (0.000023) (0.000024) (0.000025) 
Past Discovery -0.00011*** -0.00011*** -0.00011*** -0.00011*** -0.00012*** -0.00012*** 
 (0.000020) (0.000020) (0.000020) (0.000020) (0.000022) (0.000022) 
Panel C: Effect of Discovering Mineral Resources 
Discovery -0.00011*** -0.00012*** -0.00012*** -0.00013*** -0.00013*** -0.00014*** 
 (0.000022) (0.000023) (0.000024) (0.000024) (0.000025) (0.000026) 
Past Discovery -0.00011*** -0.00011*** -0.00011*** -0.00013*** -0.00012*** -0.00012*** 
 (0.000021) (0.000022) (0.000023) (0.000024) (0.000024) (0.000025) 
Country x Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 605163 579411 553659 527907 502155 476403 
Sample Period 1950-2008 1950-2008 1950-2008 1950-2008 1950-2008 1950-2008 
Notes: This table reports the effect of discovering at least one natural resource in a panel of cell-year 
observations. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered at the country level. ***, **, and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Past discovery is the number of years 





Table 5: Resource Discovery and Civil Conflict Onset: Within-Cell Effects 






t + 2 
(3) 
t + 4 
(4) 
t + 6 
(5) 
t + 8 
(6) 
t + 10 
Panel A: Effect of Discovering Natural Resource (Oilfield + Minerals) 
Discovery -0.00032* -0.00028 -0.00031 -0.00034 -0.00037 -0.00039 
 (0.00018) (0.00018) (0.0019) (0.00021) (0.00023) (0.00025) 
Past Discovery -0.00028* -0.00031 -0.00033 -0.00036 -0.00039 -0.00041 
 (0.00015) (0.00019) (0.00021) (0.00023) (0.00025) (0.00027) 
Panel B: Effect of Discovering Oilfield 
Discovery -0.00063 -0.00066 -0.00069 -0.00074 0.00078 -0.00083 
 (0.00065) (0.00068) (0.00071) (0.00075) (0.00079) (0.00083) 
Past Discovery -0.00060 -0.00063 -0.00066 -0.00071 0.00076 -0.00082 
 (0.00059) (0.00062) (0.00065) (0.00069) (0.00074) (0.00079) 
Panel C: Effect of Discovering Mineral Resources 
Discovery -0.00025 -0.00019 -0.00022 -0.00023 -0.00025 -0.00027 
 (0.00017) (0.00013) (0.00014) (0.00016) (0.00018) (0.00019) 
Past Discovery -0.00020 -0.00022 -0.00023 -0.00025 -0.00027 -0.00027 
 (0.00014) (0.00015) (0.00016) (0.00018) (0.00020) (0.00021) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cell Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cell-Specific Time Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country x Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 605163 579411 553659 527907 502155 476403 
Sample Period 1950-2008 1950-2008 1950-2008 1950-2008 1950-2008 1950-2008 
Notes: This table reports the effect of discovering at least one natural resource in a panel of cell-year 
observations. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered at the country level. ***, **, and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Past discovery is the number of years 





Table 6: Resource Discovery and Civil Conflict Onset: Within-Grid Effects with Property 
Rights Institutions as Control 






t + 2 
(3) 
t + 4 
(4) 
t + 6 
(5) 
t + 8 
(6) 
t + 10 
Panel A: Effect of Discovering Natural Resource (Oilfield + Minerals) 
Discovery -0.00045 -0.00051 -0.00063 -0.00065 -0.00074 -0.00079 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Past Discovery -0.00065 -0.00073 -0.00079 -0.00088 -0.00099 -0.00112 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Panel B: Effect of Discovering Oilfield 
Discovery -0.0035** -0.0038* -0.0041** -0.0046** -0.0048** -0.0051** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Past Discovery -0.0025** -0.0025** -0.0026** -0.0031** -0.0032** -0.0034** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Panel C: Effect of Discovering Mineral Resources 
Discovery -0.00007 -0.00005 -0.00008 -0.00005 -0.00008 -0.00008 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Past Discovery -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0005 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Political Exclusion Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cell Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cell-Specific Time Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country x Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 272,077 260,939 249,801 238,663 227,545 216,429 
Sample Period 1950-2008 1950-2008 1950-2008 1950-2008 1950-2008 1950-2008 
Notes: This table reports the effect of discovering at least one natural resource in a panel of cell-year observations. Numbers in parentheses 
are robust standard errors clustered at the country level. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. Past discovery is the number of years with discoveries from t-10 to t-1. Political Exclusion is the exclusion of the dominant 
ethnic group in a particular grid-cell from the state executive. This variable is used as a proxy for property rights institutions assuming that 





Table 7: First and Single First Resource Discoveries and Civil Conflict Onset 
Dependent Variable: Intrastate Civil Conflict Onset (PRIO-GRID Conflict Dataset) 
 Minerals + Oilfield Mineral Discoveries Oilfield Discoveries 
 First Single, First First Single, First First Single, First 
MDdt−j: Discovery Discoveries Discoveries Discoveries Discoveries Discoveries Discoveries 
   made in year t − j (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
j = 0 -0.00011 -0.00011 -0.00009 -0.00009 -0.00020 -0.00020 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
j = 2 -0.00012 -0.00013 -0.00014 -0.00015 -0.00001 -0.00001 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
j = 4 -0.00020 -0.00023 -0.00026 -0.00029 0.00002 0.00002 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
j = 6 -0.00013 -0.00015 -0.00017 -0.00018 0.00002 0.00002 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
j = 8 -0.00020 -0.00024 -0.00026 -0.00031 0.00002 0.00002 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
j = 10 -0.00022 -0.00027 -0.00028 -0.00035 0.00002 0.00002 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cell Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cell-Specific Time Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country x Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 641,908 641,695 640,546 640,397 633,157 633,093 
Sample Period 1950-2008 1950-2008 1950-2008 1950-2008 1950-2008 1950-2008 
Notes: This table reports the effect of natural resource discoveries on civil conflict onset in a panel of cell-year 
observations. Cells with pre-existing extraction (mining or oil drilling) activities were dropped from the 
regression. In column (1), the variable of interest MDdt-j is a dummy variable equal to 1 if least one natural 
resource was discovered j years ago, 0 if no discovery has been made and missing for every post-discovery year 
j > 10. In column (2), the dummies are set to missing the year a second discovery was made in the same district. 
Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered at the country level. ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
Table 8: Natural Resource Discoveries and Civil Conflict Onset (UCDP-GED) 






t + 2 
(3) 
t + 4 
(4) 
t + 6 
(5) 
t + 8 
(6) 
t + 10 
Panel A: Effect of Discovering Natural Resource (Oilfield + Minerals) 
Discovery -0.007 0.001 -0.022*** -0.008 -0.009 0.010 
 (0.009) (0.012) (0.007) (0.013) (0.011) (0.014) 
Past Discovery -0.0005 -0.0002 0.0022 -0.0009 0.0006 -0.0011 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.0044) 
Panel B: Effect of Discovering Oilfield 
Discovery -0.005 -0.028 -0.028 -0.029 -0.016 0.010 
 (0.007) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.016) (0.011) 
Past Discovery 0.018 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.020 0.009 
 (0.020) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.021) (0.009) 
Panel C: Effect of Discovering Mineral Resources 
Discovery -0.007 0.003 -0.022*** 0.011 -0.008 0.002 
 (0.010) (0.013) (0.007) (0.014) (0.013) (0.012) 
Past Discovery -0.002 -0.002 -0.0005 -0.003 -0.001 -0.002 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cell Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cell-Specific Time Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country x Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 235246 225236 215226 205216 195206 185196 
Sample Period 1989-2010 1989-2010 1989-2010 1989-2010 1989-2010 1989-2010 
Notes: This table reports the effect of discovering at least one natural resource in a panel of cell-year 
observations. Numbers in parentheses are clustered standard errors at the country level. ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Past discovery is the number of years with 









Table 9: Natural Resource Discoveries and Civil Conflict Onset (ACLED) 






t + 2 
(3) 
t + 4 
(4) 
t + 6 
(5) 
t + 8 
(6) 
t + 10 
Panel A: Effect of Discovering Natural Resource (Oilfield + Minerals) 
Discovery -0.0055 -0.0061 -0.0155* -0.0197* -0.0006 0.0194 
 (0.0161) (0.0149) (0.0094) (0.0117) (0.0199) (0.0227) 
Past Discovery -0.0019 -0.0008 0.0002 0.0002 -0.0015 -0.0032 
 (0.0077) (0.0077) (0.0082) (0.0079) (0.0079) (0.0067) 
Panel B: Effect of Discovering Oilfield 
Discovery -0.1415** -0.1085*** -0.0269 -0.0224 0.1433 -0.0015 
 (0.0664) (0.0389) (0.0311) (0.0257) (0.1671) (0.0205) 
Past Discovery -0.0217 -0.0028 -0.0113 -0.0113 -0.0299 -0.0137 
 (0.0289) (0.0175) (0.0256) (0.0259) (0.0377) (0.0267) 
Panel C: Effect of Discovering Mineral Resources 
Discovery 0.0021 03.04e-06 -0.0148 -0.0193 -0.0130 0.0214 
 (0.0148) (0.0154) (0.0098) (0.0126) (0.0161) (0.0244) 
Past Discovery -0.0005 -0.0006 0.0011 0.0011 0.0004 -0.0024 
 (0.0078) (0.0081) (0.0085) (0.0081) (0.0079) (0.0067) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cell Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cell-Specific Time Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country x Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 171088 163808 156528 149248 141968 134688 
Sample Period 1997-2012 1997-2012 1997-2012 1997-2012 1997-2012 1997-2012 
Notes: This table reports the effect of discovering at least one natural resource in a panel of cell-year 
observations. Numbers in parentheses are clustered standard errors at the country level. ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Past discovery is the number of years with 
discoveries from t-10 to t-1. 
 
 
Table 10: Resource Discoveries and Local Economic Development Measured by Luminosity 






t + 2 
(3) 
t + 4 
(4) 
t + 6 
(5) 
t + 8 
(6) 
t + 10 
Discovery 0.114* 0.172* 0.104* 0.144** 0.191** 0.184** 
 (0.063) (0.088) (0.054) (0.065) (0.079) (0.083) 
Past Discovery 0.078 0.107 0.096 0.088 0.070 0.071 
 (0.082) (0.092) (0.084) (0.080) (0.080) (0.083) 
Population Density 0.172 0.172 0.172 0.172 0.172 0.172 
 (0.126) (0.126) (0.126) (0.126) (0.126) (0.126) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cell Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cell-Specific Time Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country x Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 215439 206271 197103 187935 178767 169599 
Sample Period 1992-2012 1992-2012 1992-2012 1992-2012 1992-2012 1992-2012 
Notes: This table reports the effect of discovering at least one natural resource on local economic development 
in a panel of cell-year observations. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of luminosity density. 
Numbers in parentheses are clustered standard errors at the country level. ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Past discovery is the number of years with discoveries 




















Table 11: Discoveries, Economic Development and Conflict: Testing the Income Mechanism 






t + 2 
(3) 
t + 4 
(4) 
t + 6 
(5) 
t + 8 
(6) 
t + 10 
Local Income -0.0032* -0.003* -0.0026* -0.001 -0.004* -0.003* 
 (0.0017) (0.0016) (0.0014) (0.002) (0.002) (0.0017) 
Discovery -0.011 -0.004 -0.020*** 0.004 -0.013* -0.003 
 (0.011) (0.013) (0.007) (0.015) (0.007) (0.014) 
Past Discovery 0.004 -0.005 -0.007 -0.006 -0.003 -0.004 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) 
Population Density 0.001 0.018 0.048*** 0.073*** 0.074*** 0.061*** 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.015) (0.023) (0.021) (0.020) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cell Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cell-Specific Time Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country x Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 194921 186627 178333 170039 161745 153451 
Sample Period 1992-2010 1992-2010 1992-2010 1992-2010 1992-2010 1992-2010 
Notes: This table reports the effect of discovering at least one natural resource and local economic development 
on civil conflict in a panel of cell-year observations. The local economic development is natural logarithm of 
luminosity adjusted for grid surface area. The dependent variable is the onset of civil conflict based on the 
UCDP GED dataset simple because the sample period matches more with the night lights data. Numbers in 
parentheses are clustered standard errors at the country level. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 




Table 12: Natural Resources, Cabinet Size and Military Expenditure 
Dependent Variable: State Cabinet Sizes  Military Expenditure 
(% of GDP) 
 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Resource Discovery 0.4013*** 0.5323***  -0.0334*** -0.0538** 
 (0.060) (0.066)  (0.011) (0.025) 
Ruler Years in Power  0.0586**   0.0090 
  (0.025)   (0.015) 
Ongoing Civil War  0.8447*   0.9179*** 
  (0.503)   (0.321) 
Lagged GDP Growth  0.0377   -0.0207 
  (0.023)   (0.028) 
Lagged Population  0.6236***   -0.0320 
  (0.200)   (0.146) 
Lagged Aid Per Capita  0.0230***   -0.0052 
  (0.006)   (0.004) 
Ethnic Fractionalisation  0.7602   -0.2639 
  (0.892)   (0.490) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations 813 667  603 276 
Sample Period 1960-2004 1960-2004  1988-2012 1988-2012 
Notes: In Figure 8, we present a graphical non-parametric association between government cabinet size (the 
number of cabinet positions), military expenditure and natural resource discovery. This table reports the 
regression estimations showing the association between natural resources, cabinet sizes and military expenditure 
at the country level. We also control for important economic and political variables. Numbers in parentheses are 
robust standard errors clustered at the country level. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 

















Table 13: Size of Resource Discoveries and Civil Conflict Onset 






t + 2 
(3) 
t + 4 
(4) 
t + 6 
(5) 
t + 8 
(6) 
t + 10 
Panel A: Effect of Giant Discovery of Natural Resource (Oilfield + Minerals) 
Discovery -0.00025 -0.00026 -0.00029 -0.00030 -0.00033 -0.00035 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Past Discovery -0.00025 -0.00027 -0.00029 -0.00031 -0.00034 -0.00036 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Panel B: Effect of Giant Discovery of Mineral Resources 
Discovery -0.00002 -0.00002 -0.00002 -0.00002 -0.00001 -0.00001 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Past Discovery -0.00003* -0.00002* -0.00002 -0.00002 -0.00002 -0.00001 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Panel C: Effect of Major Mineral Discovery 
Discovery -0.00038 -0.00032 -0.00036 -0.00039 -0.00042 -0.00045 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Past Discovery -0.00034 -0.00037 -0.00040 -0.00044 -0.00048 -0.00049 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cell Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cell-Specific Time Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country x Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 605163 579411 553659 527907 502155 476403 
Sample Period 1950-2008 1950-2008 1950-2008 1950-2008 1950-2008 1950-2008 
Notes: The table reports the effect of giant and major discoveries in a panel of cell-year observations. Note that 
all oil discoveries in the dataset are giant whereas mineral discoveries are giant and major. Numbers in 
parentheses are robust standard errors clustered at the country level. ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Past discovery is the number of years with discoveries 
from t-10 to t-1. 
 
 
Table 14: Natural Resource Discovery, Democracy and Conflict 






t + 2 
(3) 
t + 4 
(4) 
t + 6 
(5) 
t + 8 
(6) 
t + 10 
Panel A: Effect of Discovering Natural Resource (Oilfield + Minerals) 
Discovery -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0004* 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Discovery * Polity2 0.00002 0.00002 0.00002 0.00002 0.00002 0.00003 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Past Discovery -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0004 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Panel B: Effect of Discovering Oilfield 
Discovery -0.0035*** -0.0037*** -0.0038*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.0044*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Discovery * Polity2 -0.0005*** -0.0005*** -0.0006*** -0.0006*** -0.0006*** -0.0006*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Past Discovery -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0008 -0.0008 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Panel C: Effect of Discovering Mineral Resources 
Discovery -0.0002 -0.0002* -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0003 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Discovery * Polity2 0.00004* 0.00004 0.00004 0.00004 0.00005 0.00005 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Past Discovery -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0003 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cell Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cell-Specific Time Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country x Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 605163 579411 553659 527907 502155 476403 
Sample Period 1950-2008 1950-2008 1950-2008 1950-2008 1950-2008 1950-2008 
Notes: This table reports the effect of discovering at least one natural resource in a panel of cell-year 
observations. The dependent variable is civil conflict onset based on the PRIO-GRID conflict. The Polity2 score 
ranges from -10 to +10, with higher values indicating stronger country-level democratic institutions. Numbers in 
parentheses are robust standard errors clustered at the country level. ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 15: Natural Resource Discoveries and Civil Conflict Onset: Region Level Analysis 






t + 2 
(3) 
t + 4 
(4) 
t + 6 
(5) 
t + 8 
(6) 
t + 10 
Panel A: Effect of Discovering Natural Resource (Oilfield + Minerals) 
Discovery -0.0036** -0.0036** 0.0007 -0.0033** 0.0009 -0.0031** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) 
Past Discovery -0.0013* -0.0010 -0.0015** -0.0014* -0.0016** -0.0015** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Panel B: Effect of Discovering Oilfield 
Discovery -0.0028 -0.0029 -0.0023 -0.0024 -0.0026 -0.0027 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Past Discovery -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0012 -0.0012 -0.0012 -0.0012 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Panel C: Effect of Discovering Mineral Resources 
Discovery -0.0039** -0.0039** 0.0012 -0.0036** 0.0015 -0.0032** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) 
Past Discovery -0.0019* -0.0013* -0.0017* -0.0015* -0.0018** -0.0017** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region-Specific Time Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country x Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 25370 24508 23646 22784 21922 21060 
Sample Period 1950-2008 1950-2008 1950-2008 1950-2008 1950-2008 1950-2008 
Notes: This table reports the effect of discovering at least one natural resource in a panel of region-year 
Observations. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered at the country level. ***, **, and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Past discovery is the number of years 
with discoveries from t-10 to t-1. 
 
 
Table 16: Natural Resource Discoveries and Civil Conflict Onset: Country Level Analysis 






t + 2 
(3) 
t + 4 
(4) 
t + 6 
(5) 
t + 8 
(6) 
t + 10 
Panel A: Effect of Discovering Natural Resource (Oilfield + Minerals) 
Discovery -0.0107 -0.0042 0.0114 -0.0122 0.0032 -0.0060 
 (0.009) (0.015) (0.017) (0.008) (0.011) (0.010) 
Past Discovery 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0032 -0.0032 -0.0038 -0.0039* 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Panel B: Effect of Discovering Oilfield 
Discovery 0.0185 0.0173 0.0169 -0.0213* 0.0217 -0.0145* 
 (0.024) (0.034) (0.025) (0.012) (0.029) (0.008) 
Past Discovery 0.0001 -0.0005 -0.0022 -0.0024 -0.0047 -0.0039 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) 
Panel C: Effect of Discovering Mineral Resources 
Discovery -0.0169* -0.0088 0.0099 -0.0106 -0.0004 -0.0048 
 (0.010) (0.013) (0.020) (0.010) (0.012) (0.011) 
Past Discovery -0.0007 -0.0003 -0.0045 -0.0041 -0.0037 -0.0039 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country x Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2773 2677 2581 2485 2389 2293 
Sample Period 1950-2008 1950-2008 1950-2008 1950-2008 1950-2008 1950-2008 
Notes: This table reports the effect of discovering at least one natural resource in a panel of country-year 
Observations. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered at the country level. ***, **, and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Past discovery is the number of years 








Table 17: Value of Discovery and Civil Conflict Onset 




UCDP GED Dataset 
(3) 
ACLED Dataset 
Panel A: Effect of Discovering Natural Resource (Oilfield + Minerals) 












Panel B: Effect of Discovering Oilfield 












Panel C: Effect of Discovering Mineral Resources 












Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Cell Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Cell-Specific Time Trend Yes Yes Yes 
Country x Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 343,392 152,514 110,743 
Sample Period 1950-2008 1989-2010 1997-2012 
Notes: This table reports the effect of interaction term between the global commodity price and the dummy for natural 
resource discovery in a panel of cell-year observations. Our commodity prices are natural logarithm of time-varying and 
cell-specific global commodity price index as defined in section 3.4. The discovery dummy variable here takes the value 0 
before discovery and 1 after discovery. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered at the country level. ***, 
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Figure A.1: Comparison of Conflict Datasets - Percentage of Grids in Conflict 
 
(a) PRIO-GRID Onset Conflict 
 
(b) ACLED Battle related conflict 
 
(c) ACLED All conflict 
 
(d) UCDP GED conflict 
Notes: The figures show the comparison PRIO-GRID, ACLED and UCDP GED conflict datasets. It represents 














Figure A.2: Comparison of Conflict Datasets - Distribution of Grids in Conflict 
 
 
(a) PRIO-GRID Onset Conflict 
 
(b) ACLED All conflict 
 
(c) ACLED Battle related conflict 
 
(d) UCDP GED conflict 
Notes: The figures show the comparison PRIO-GRID, ACLED and UCDP GED conflict datasets. It represents 
the distribution of grids in conflict when the country is in armed conflict. Note that for ACLED, we show both 









Figure A.3: Kaplan Meier Probability Estimate for Mineral Discoveries Entering Production 
 
 
Notes: This graph shows the proportion of discoveries entering production as a function of time after discovery. 
The Kaplan Meier estimator is used because mine start-ups are not observed for years after 2012 and therefore 
right censored. Data for discoveries and mine start-ups 1950-2012 from MinEx. 
 
Figure A.4: Minerals and Oilfield Discovery - Percentage of Grids with Discovery 
 
 
(a) Mineral Discovery 
 
 
(b) Oilfield Discovery 














Figure A.5: Minerals and Oilfield Discovery - Distribution of Grids with Discovery 
 
 
(a) Mineral Discovery 
 
 
(b) Oilfield Discovery 
 
Notes: The figures show the distribution of grids discovered minerals or oilfield when the country has 
discovered. 
 
Table A.1: Descriptive Statistics of Primary Commodity 
MinEx Mineral Resource Discovery 
 Primary Metal Share Largest Country Country Share Copper 0.103 DRC 0.482 
Diamonds 0.053 Angola and Botswana 0.286 
Fluorite 0.004 South Africa 1.000 
Gold 0.479 South Africa 0.222 
Graphite 0.004 Tanzania 1.000 
Lead 0.004 South Africa 1.000 
Manganese 0.030 South Africa 0.625 
Mineral Sands 0.030 Madagascar, Mozambique, Sierra Leone and South Africa 0.250 
Nickel 0.095 South Africa, Tanzania and Zimbabwe 0.160 
Niobium 0.008 Gabon and Tanzania 0.500 
PGE 0.068 South Africa 0.944 
Phosphate 0.004 Rep of Congo 1.000 
Platinum 0.015 South Africa 0.750 
Potash 0.008 Rep of Congo 1.000 
Rare Earths 0.011 South Africa 0.667 
Silver 0.004 South Africa 1.000 
Uranium 0.053 Namibia 0.500 
Zinc 0.019 Namibia and South Africa 0.400 
Zircon 0.008 Madagascar and Senegal 0.500 
  Mike Horn Oilfield Discovery  
Field Type Share Largest Country Country Share 
Oil 0.780 Libya 0.522 
Gas 0.220 Algeria 0.538 
Notes: Sample Period: 1950-2012. Primary Metal: primary mine deposit discovered. Field Type: the type of deposits - 
oilfields or natural gas fields. Share: share of primary commodity in the total sample of the discovery. Largest Country: 
country with the largest share of the primary mine discovered. Country Share: share of the country in the total sample. 
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Table A.2: Descriptive Statistics at the Country Level - MinEx Mineral Discovery 
Country Discovery Max Disc Share1 Share2 Country Discovery Max Disc Share1 Share2 
Algeria 1 1 0.001 0.004 Liberia 3 1 0.071 0.012 
Angola 5 1 0.012 0.019 Madagascar 4 1 0.019 0.016 
Botswana 11 2 0.057 0.043 Mali 13 3 0.030 0.050 
Burkina Faso 17 3 0.185 0.066 Mauritania 2 1 0.005 0.008 
Burundi 1 1 0.125 0.004 Mozambique 3 2 0.011 0.012 
Cameroon 1 1 0.007 0.004 Namibia 12 2 0.040 0.047 
CAR 2 1 0.010 0.008 Niger 4 1 0.010 0.016 
DRC 19 3 0.025 0.074 Rep of Congo 3 1 0.028 0.012 
Cote d’Ivoire 7 1 0.067 0.027 Senegal 6 2 0.082 0.023 
Egypt 3 1 0.009 0.012 Sierra Leone 2 1 0.100 0.008 
Eritrea 1 1 0.024 0.004 South Africa 67 4 0.141 0.260 
Ethiopia 3 1 0.008 0.012 Sudan 1 1 0.001 0.004 
Gabon 4 1 0.044 0.016 Tanzania 21 3 0.070 0.081 
Ghana 13 2 0.160 0.050 Togo 1 1 0.063 0.004 
Guinea 9 3 0.105 0.035 Zambia 7 2 0.028 0.027 
Lesotho 1 1 0.063 0.004 Zimbabwe 10 2 0.074 0.039 
Notes: Sample Period: 1950-2012. Country: country which discovered mine deposit. Discovery: total number of 
discovery in the country over the sample period. Max Disc: maximum number of yearly discovery in the 
country over the sample period. Share1: share of grids in the country discovered at least one mine deposit over 





Table A.3: Descriptive Statistics at the Country Level - Mike Horn Oilfield Discovery 
Country Discovery Max Disc Share1 Share2 
Algeria 11 2 0.013 0.186 
Egypt 1 1 0.003 0.017 
Ethiopia 1 1 0.003 0.017 
Gabon 1 1 0.011 0.017 
Libya 27 5 0.046 0.458 
Morocco 1 1 0.006 0.017 
Nigeria 14 4 0.045 0.237 
Rep of Congo 1 1 0.009 0.017 
Sudan 2 1 0.002 0.034 
Notes: Sample Period: 1950-2012. Country: country which discovered oilfield deposit. Discovery: total number 
of discovery in the country over the sample period. Max Disc: maximum number of yearly discovery in the 
country over the sample period. Share1: share of grids in the country discovered at least one oilfield over the 
sample period. Share2: country’s share of mineral discovery in the African continent over the sample period. 
 
Table A.4: Descriptive Statistics at the Country Level - PRIO-GRID 
Country Events Max Events Share1 Share2 Country Events Max Events Share1 Share2 
Algeria 1 1 0.0001 0.012 Liberia 1 1 0.0001 0.012 
Angola 3 1 0.0003 0.036 Madagascar 1 1 0.0003 0.012 
Burkina Faso 1 1 0.0001 0.012 Mali 2 1 0.0001 0.024 
Cameroon 3 1 0.0003 0.036 Morocco 2 1 0.0003 0.024 
CAR 1 1 0.0001 0.012 Namibia 1 1 0.0001 0.012 
Chad 3 1 0.0003 0.036 Niger 6 1 0.0003 0.071 
Cote d’Ivoire 2 1 0.0002 0.024 Rwanda 2 1 0.0002 0.024 
DRC 12 1 0.001 0.143 Nigeria 3 1 0.001 0.036 
Equatorial Guinea 3 3 0.0003 0.036 Senegal 1 1 0.0003 0.012 
Eritrea 2 1 0.0002 0.024 Somalia 6 1 0.0002 0.071 
Ethiopia 5 2 0.0005 0.060 Sudan 5 1 0.0005 0.060 
Ghana 3 1 0.0003 0.036 Tanzania 1 1 0.0003 0.012 
Guinea 2 1 0.0002 0.024 Tunisia 1 1 0.0002 0.012 
Guinea Bissau 5 2 0.0005 0.060 Uganda 1 1 0.0005 0.012 
Kenya 1 1 0.0001 0.012 Zambia 1 1 0.0001 0.012 
Lesotho 1 1 0.0001 0.012 Zimbabwe 2 1 0.0001 0.024 
Notes: Sample Period: 1946-2008. Country: country in which the conflict event took place. Events: total number 
of events in the country over the sample period. Max Events: maximum number of yearly events in the country 
over the sample period. Share1: share of grids in the country affected by at least one conflict over the sample 







Table A.5: Descriptive Statistics at the Country Level – ACLED 
Country Events Max Events Share1 Share2 Country Events Max Events Share1 Share2 
Algeria 1366 274 0.108 0.045 Madagascar 54 23 0.088 0.002 
Angola 2178 1215 0.368 0.071 Malawi 5 2 0.143 0.0002 
Benin 2 1 0.056 0.0001 Mali 321 165 0.098 0.011 
Botswana 3 1 0.015 0.0001 Mauritania 16 5 0.024 0.001 
Burkina Faso 23 6 0.207 0.001 Morocco 12 5 0.025 0.0004 
Burundi 1479 363 1.000 0.049 Mozambique 46 23 0.032 0.002 
Cameroon 77 14 0.157 0.003 Namibia 80 50 0.060 0.003 
CAR 481 122 0.284 0.016 Niger 148 34 0.091 0.005 
Chad 309 73 0.128 0.010 Nigeria 1785 318 0.534 0.059 
Cote d’Ivoire 478 111 0.343 0.016 Rep of Congo 190 70 0.239 0.006 
DRC 3847 407 0.361 0.126 Rwanda 144 77 0.750 0.005 
Djibouti 18 5 0.500 0.001 Senegal 232 31 0.247 0.008 
Egypt 513 343 0.083 0.017 Sierra Leone 838 286 1.000 0.028 
Equatorial Guinea 7 4 0.053 0.0002 Somalia 6927 1928 0.612 0.227 
Eritrea 234 142 0.357 0.008 South Africa 88 26 0.067 0.003 
Ethiopia 1261 179 0.496 0.041 Sudan 1529 336 0.305 0.050 
Gabon 3 1 0.033 0.0001 Swaziland 1 1 0.375 0.00003 
Ghana 64 11 0.222 0.002 Tanzania 46 11 0.083 0.002 
Guinea 171 61 0.233 0.006 Togo 11 4 0.750 0.0004 
Guinea-Bissau 110 63 0.471 0.004 Tunisia 110 54 0.352 0.004 
Kenya 1023 122 0.556 0.034 Uganda 1734 297 0.813 0.057 
Lesotho 26 17 0.250 0.001 Zambia 20 4 0.044 0.001 
Liberia 586 194 0.738 0.019 Zimbabwe 59 10 0.103 0.002 
Libya 816 505 0.070 0.027 
Notes: Sample Period: 1997-2012. Country: country in which the conflict event took place. Events: total number 
of events in the country over the sample period. Max Events: maximum number of yearly events in the country 
over the sample period. Share1: share of grids in the country affected by at least one conflict over the sample 





Table A.6: Descriptive Statistics at the Country Level - UCDP GED 
Country Events Max Events Share1 Share2 Country Events Max Events Share1 Share2 
Algeria 3591 383 0.128 0.148 Mali 104 41 0.084 0.004 
Angola 1912 316 0.438 0.079 Mauritania 20 12 0.021 0.001 
Botswana 1 1 0.011 0.0000004 Morocco 10 6 0.019 0.0004 
Burundi 1387 193 1.000 0.057 Mozambique 263 131 0.276 0.011 
Cameroon 45 8 0.092 0.002 Namibia 24 17 0.050 0.001 
CAR 195 52 0.160 0.008 Niger 90 22 0.096 0.004 
Chad 298 62 0.133 0.012 Nigeria 428 78 0.296 0.018 
Comoros 6 3 0.152 0.0002 Rep of Congo 214 55 1.000 0.009 
Cote d’Ivoire 162 47 0.264 0.007 Senegal 282 39 0.233 0.012 
DRC 2001 547 0.211 0.083 Rwanda 467 161 1.000 0.019 
Djibouti 44 10 0.625 0.002 Sierra Leone 1468 347 0.372 0.061 
Egypt 373 117 0.075 0.015 Somalia 1943 316 0.261 0.080 
Eritrea 43 13 0.429 0.002 South Africa 2781 576 0.250 0.115 
Ethiopia 1351 144 0.499 0.056 Sudan 1766 223 0.750 0.073 
Ghana 38 10 0.173 0.002 Swaziland 2 2 0.027 0.0001 
Guinea 68 26 0.186 0.003 Tanzania 7 3 0.500 0.0003 
Guinea-Bissau 12 9 0.412 0.001 Togo 96 83 0.019 0.004 
Kenya 423 119 0.317 0.018 Tunisia 1 1 0.813 0.0000004 
Lesotho 5 5 0.438 0.0002 Uganda 1655 251 0.054 0.068 
Liberia 545 137 0.905 0.023 Zambia 12 6 0.032 0.001 
Madagascar 39 32 0.037 0.002 Zimbabwe 53 40 0.184 0.002 
Notes: Sample Period: 1989-2010. Country: country in which the conflict event took place. Events: total number 
of events in the country over the sample period. Max Events: maximum number of yearly events in the country 
over the sample period. Share1: share of grids in the country affected by at least one conflict over the sample 












Table A.7: Past Discoveries and Near Future Discoveries: Region Level 













Past Discovery 0.04381*** 0.01686** 0.04332*** 0.03022*** 0.04505*** 0.00838 
 (0.005) (0.007) (0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) 
Year Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Region Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Region-Specific Time Trend No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Country x Year Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 27090 27090 27090 27090 27090 27090 
Sample Period 1950-2012 1950-2012 1950-2012 1950-2012 1950-2012 1950-2012 
Notes: This table reports whether discoveries in a region’s recent past raise the odds of additional discoveries in 
its near future. The explanatory variable (past discovery) is the number of years with discoveries from t-10 to t-
1. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered at the country level. ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
Table A.8: Past Discoveries and Near Future Discoveries: Country Level 













Past Discovery 0.0538*** 0.0279*** 0.0454*** 0.0328*** 0.0596*** 0.0218* 
 (0.004) (0.007) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.012) 
Year Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Country Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Country x Year Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 2961 2961 2961 2961 2961 2961 
Sample Period 1950-2012 1950-2012 1950-2012 1950-2012 1950-2012 1950-2012 
Notes: This table reports whether discoveries in a country’s recent past raise the odds of additional discoveries 
in its near future. The explanatory variable (past discovery) is the number of years with discoveries from t-10 to 
t-1. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered at the country level. ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
Table A.9: Resource Discoveries and Civil Conflict Onset: First Resource Discoveries 
Dependent Variable: Intrastate Civil Conflict Onset (UCDP-GED Conflict Dataset) 
 Minerals + Oilfield Mineral Discoveries Oilfield Discoveries 
 First Single, First First Single, First First Single, First 
MDdt−j: Discovery Discoveries Discoveries Discoveries Discoveries Discoveries Discoveries    made in year t − j (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
j = 0 -0.01619 -0.01602** -0.01594 -0.01577 -0.01742 -0.01791 
 (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.013) (0.000) 
j = 2 -0.00123 -0.00039 -0.00053 0.00039 -0.00977 -0.01199 
 (0.000) (0.013) (0.000) (0.000) (0.011) (0.000) 
j = 4 -0.03028 -0.03179** -0.03051 -0.03217 -0.02280* -0.02126 
 (0.000) (0.013) (0.000) (0.000) (0.013) (0.000) 
j = 6 -0.00995 -0.00999 -0.00906 -0.00895 -0.01716 -0.01867 
 (0.000) (0.020) (0.000) (0.000) (0.014) (0.000) 
j = 8 -0.01240 -0.01331 -0.01263 -0.01376 -0.00465 -0.00091 
 (0.000) (0.017) (0.000) (0.000) (0.008) (0.000) 
j = 10 -0.00415 -0.00512 -0.01061 -0.01237 0.06998 0.08361 
 (0.000) (0.023) (0.000) (0.000) (0.075) (0.000) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cell Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cell-Specific Time Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country x Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 220,058 219,985 219,939 219,876 218,034 218,024 
Sample Period 1989-2010 1989-2010 1989-2010 1989-2010 1989-2010 1989-2010 
Notes: This table reports the effect of natural resource discoveries on civil conflict onset in a panel of cell-year 
observations. Cells with pre-existing extraction (mining or oil drilling) activities were dropped from the 
regression. In column (1), the variable of interest MDdt-j is a dummy variable equal to 1 if least one natural 
resource was discovered j years ago, 0 if no discovery has been made and missing for every post-discovery year 
j > 10. In column (2), the dummies are set to missing the year a second discovery was made in the same district. 
Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered at the country level. ***, **, and * indicate 




Table A.10: Resource Discoveries and Civil Conflict Onset: First Resource Discoveries 
Dependent Variable: Intrastate Civil Conflict Onset (UCD-GED Conflict Dataset) 
 Minerals + Oilfield Mineral Discoveries Oilfield Discoveries 
 First Single, First First Single, First First Single, First 
MDdt−j: Discovery Discoveries Discoveries Discoveries Discoveries Discoveries Discoveries    made in year t − j (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
j = 0 -0.01309 -0.01316 -0.00103 -0.00102 -0.22061 -0.22052 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.017) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
j = 2 -0.01867 -0.01953 -0.00695 -0.00689 -0.22617 -0.22606 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.014) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
j = 4 -0.01463 -0.01287 -0.00881 -0.00627 -0.15172 -0.16376 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.011) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
j = 6 -0.02387 -0.02227 -0.01785 -0.01571 -0.15400 -0.15541 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.012) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
j = 8 -0.00533 -0.00225 -0.01510 -0.01260 0.05778 0.10171 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.013) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
j = 10 0.03640 0.04396 0.04424 0.05179 -0.12524 -0.12060 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.038) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cell Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cell-Specific Time Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country x Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 159,357 159,297 159,280 159,228 158,171 158,163 
Sample Period 1997-2012 1997-2012 1997-2012 1997-2012 1997-2012 1997-2012 
Notes: This table reports the effect of natural resource discoveries on civil conflict onset in a panel of cell-year 
observations. Cells with pre-existing extraction (mining or oil drilling) activities were dropped from the 
regression. In column (1), the variable of interest MDdt-j is a dummy variable equal to 1 if least one natural 
resource was discovered j years ago, 0 if no discovery has been made and missing for every post-discovery year 
j > 10. In column (2), the dummies are set to missing the year a second discovery was made in the same district. 
Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered at the country level. ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Table A.11: Natural Resource Discoveries and Civil Conflict Incidence - Within-Grids Effect 








t + 2 
(3) 
t + 4 
(4) 
t + 6 
(5) 
t + 8 
(6) 
t + 10 
Panel A: Effect of Discovering Natural Resource (Oilfield + Minerals) 
Discovery -0.012 -0.010 -0.018 0.007 -0.002 0.009 
 (0.015) (0.014) (0.013) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) 
Past Discovery -0.010 -0.008 -0.007 -0.010 -0.009 -0.010 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) 
Panel B: Effect of Discovering Oilfield 
Discovery 0.075 -0.024 -0.024 -0.024 -0.011 0.087 
 (0.080) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.011) (0.089) 
Past Discovery 0.017 0.015 0.016 0.016 0.014 0.005 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.017) (0.017) (0.015) (0.005) 
Panel C: Effect of Discovering Mineral Resources 
Discovery -0.018 -0.009 -0.018 0.009 -0.001 0.002 
 (0.016) (0.015) (0.013) (0.017) (0.017) (0.014) 
Past Discovery -0.012 -0.010 -0.009 -0.012 -0.011 -0.011 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cell Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cell-Specific Time Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country x Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 235246 225236 215226 205216 195206 185196 
Sample Period 1989-2010 1989-2010 1989-2010 1989-2010 1989-2010 1989-2010 
Notes: This table reports the effect of discovering at least one natural resource in a panel of cell-year 
observations. Numbers in parentheses are clustered standard errors at the country level. ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Past discovery is the number of years with 










Table A.12: Natural Resource Discoveries and Civil Conflict Intensity - Within-Grids Effect 






t + 2 
(3) 
t + 4 
(4) 
t + 6 
(5) 
t + 8 
(6) 
t + 10 
Panel A: Effect of Discovering Natural Resource (Oilfield + Minerals) 
Discovery -0.035* -0.014 -0.006 0.005 -0.002 0.004 
 (0.018) (0.020) (0.025) (0.018) (0.016) (0.017) 
Past Discovery -0.017 -0.014 -0.015 -0.16 -0.015 -0.016 
 (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.13) (0.012) (0.014) 
Panel B: Effect of Discovering Oilfield 
Discovery 0.028 -0.013 -0.012 -0.012 -0.0004 0.043 
 (0.115) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.002) (0.045) 
Past Discovery 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 -0.003 
 (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004) 
Panel C: Effect of Discovering Mineral Resources 
Discovery -0.039* -0.014 -0.005 0.006 -0.002 0.001 
 (0.017) (0.021) (0.030) (0.019) (0.017) (0.018) 
Past Discovery -0.019 -0.015 -0.016 -0.017 -0.017 -0.0017 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.015) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cell Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cell-Specific Time Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country x Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 235246 225236 215226 205216 195206 185196 
Sample Period 1989-2010 1989-2010 1989-2010 1989-2010 1989-2010 1989-2010 
Notes: This table reports the effect of discovering at least one natural resource in a panel of cell-year 
observations. Numbers in parentheses are clustered standard errors at the country level. ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Past discovery is the number of years with 
discoveries from t-10 to t-1. 
 
 
Table A.13: Natural Resource Discoveries and Civil Conflict Incidence - Within Grids Effect 






t + 2 
(3) 
t + 4 
(4) 
t + 6 
(5) 
t + 8 
(6) 
t + 10 
Panel A: Effect of Discovering Natural Resource (Oilfield + Minerals) 
Discovery -0.0197 -0.0137 -0.0015 -0.0272** 0.0054 0.0147 
 (0.0241) (0.0181) (0.0136) (0.0109) (0.0188) (0.0278) 
Past Discovery -0.008 -0.005 -0.007 -0.005 -0.007 -0.008 
 (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Panel B: Effect of Discovering Oilfield 
Discovery -0.1873** -0.1394** -0.0431 -0.0353 0.1301 0.0033 
 (0.0893) (0.0553) (0.0476) (0.0399) (0.1499) (0.0231) 
Past Discovery -0.032 -0.008 -0.018 -0.018 -0.036 -0.022 
 (0.036) (0.020) (0.030) (0.031) (0.041) (0.032) 
Panel C: Effect of Discovering Mineral Resources 
Discovery -0.0105 -0.0063 0.0009 -0.0264** -0.0049 0.0159 
 (0.0227) (0.0183) (0.0142) (0.0117) (0.0158) (0.0300) 
Past Discovery -0.007 -0.005 -0.006 -0.003 -0.005 -0.007 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cell Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cell-Specific Time Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country x Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 171088 163808 156528 149248 141968 134688 
Sample Period 1997-2012 1997-2012 1997-2012 1997-2012 1997-2012 1997-2012 
Notes: This table reports the effect of discovering at least one natural resource in a panel of cell-year 
observations. Numbers in parentheses are clustered standard errors at the country level. ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Past discovery is the number of years with 












Table A.14: Natural Resource Discoveries and Civil Conflict Intensity - Within Grids Effect 






t + 2 
(3) 
t + 4 
(4) 
t + 6 
(5) 
t + 8 
(6) 
t + 10 
Panel A: Effect of Discovering Natural Resource (Oilfield + Minerals) 
Discovery -0.0142 -0.0479* 0.0259 -0.0024 0.0237 -0.0067 
 (0.0336) (0.0277) (0.0329) (0.0299) (0.0282) (0.0339) 
Past Discovery -0.001 0.006 -0.003 0.000 -0.002 0.001 
 (0.018) (0.019) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.018) 
Panel B: Effect of Discovering Oilfield 
Discovery -0.1774** -0.1416** -0.0535 -0.0453 0.1859 -0.0066 
 (0.0854) (0.0545) (0.0497) (0.0417) (0.2198) (0.0244) 
Past Discovery -0.022 0.002 -0.007 -0.007 -0.033 -0.012 
 (0.033) (0.020) (0.029) (0.030) (0.044) (0.031) 
Panel C: Effect of Discovering Mineral Resources 
Discovery -0.0052 -0.0425 0.0307 0.0010 0.0102 -0.0066 
 (0.0336) (0.0291) (0.0348) (0.0322) (0.0177) (0.0368) 
Past Discovery 0.001 0.006 -0.002 0.001 0.000 0.002 
 (0.020) (0.021) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.019) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cell Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cell-Specific Time Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country x Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 171088 163808 156528 149248 141968 134688 
Sample Period 1997-2012 1997-2012 1997-2012 1997-2012 1997-2012 1997-2012 
Notes: This table reports the effect of discovering at least one natural resource in a panel of cell-year 
observations. Numbers in parentheses are clustered standard errors at the country level. ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Past discovery is the number of years with 
discoveries from t-10 to t-1. 
 
 
Table A.15: Resource Discoveries and Civil Conflict Onset: Time-varying distance from 
discovery - do we expect conflict occurring far away from oilfield or mines? 






t + 2 
(3) 
t + 4 
(4) 
t + 6 
(5) 
t + 8 
(6) 
t + 10 
Distance from Discovery (km) -0.00002 -0.00001 -0.00004 -0.00001 -0.00002 0.00001 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cell Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cell-Specific Time Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country x Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 605163 579411 553659 527907 502155 476403 
Sample Period 1950-2008 1950-2008 1950-2008 1950-2008 1950-2008 1950-2008 
Notes: This table reports the effect of discovering at least one natural resource in a panel of cell-year 
observations. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered at the country level. ***, **, and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Distance from discovery is time-
varying distance of grid’s centroid from the nearest discovery field each year. 
 
Table A.16: Resource Discoveries and Civil Conflict Onset: Time-varying distance from 
discovery - do we expect conflict occurring far away from oilfield or mines? 






t + 2 
(3) 
t + 4 
(4) 
t + 6 
(5) 
t + 8 
(6) 
t + 10 
Distance from Discovery (km) 0.00052 0.00025 0.00164 0.00039 -0.00135 -0.00021 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cell Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cell-Specific Time Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country x Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 171088 163808 156528 149248 141968 134688 
Sample Period 1997-2012 1997-2012 1997-2012 1997-2012 1997-2012 1997-2012 
Notes: This table reports the effect of discovering at least one natural resource in a panel of cell-year 
observations. Numbers in parentheses are clustered standard errors at the country level. ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Distance from discovery is time-varying 
distance of grid’s centroid from the nearest discovery field each year. 
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Table A.17: Resource Discoveries and Civil Conflict Onset: Time-varying distance from 
discovery - do we expect conflict occurring far away from oilfield or mines? 






t + 2 
(3) 
t + 4 
(4) 
t + 6 
(5) 
t + 8 
(6) 
t + 10 
Distance from Discovery (km) -0.0010 -0.0012 -0.0016 -0.0026* -0.00067 -0.00162 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cell Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cell-Specific Time Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country x Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 235246 225236 215226 205216 195206 185196 
Sample Period 1989-2010 1989-2010 1989-2010 1989-2010 1989-2010 1989-2010 
Notes: This table reports the effect of discovering at least one natural resource in a panel of cell-year 
observations. Numbers in parentheses are clustered standard errors at the country level. ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Distance from discovery is time-varying 





Table A.18: Resource Discoveries and Civil Conflict Onset: Proximity to the borders: 
proximity to borders is known to be an indicator for conflict propensity 






t + 2 
(3) 
t + 4 
(4) 
t + 6 
(5) 
t + 8 
(6) 
t + 10 
Panel A: Distance to the Border, <= 25km 
Discovery -0.00048 0.00005* 0.00003* 0.00001 -0.00005 -0.00012 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 71449 68409 65369 62329 59289 56249 
Panel B: Distance to the Border, <= 50km 
Discovery -0.00084* 0.00006* 0.00002 0.00000 -0.00007 -0.00013** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 132986 127327 121668 116009 110350 104691 
Panel C: Distance to the Border, <= 100km 
Discovery -0.00055 0.00005 0.00002** -0.00000 -0.00004 -0.00008 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 237298 227201 217104 207007 196910 186813 
Panel D: Distance to the Border, < 100km 
Discovery -0.00046 0.00004 0.00002** 0.00001 -0.00003 -0.00010 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Past Discovery Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cell Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cell-Specific Time Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country x Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 392055 375372 358689 342006 325323 308640 
Sample Period 1950-2008 1950-2008 1950-2008 1950-2008 1950-2008 1950-2008 
Notes: This table reports the effect of discovering at least one natural resource in a panel of cell-year 
observations. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered at the country level. ***, **, and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Past discovery is the number of years 



















Table A.19: Resource Discoveries and Civil Conflict Onset: Proximity to the borders: 
proximity to borders is known to be an indicator for conflict propensity. 






t + 2 
(3) 
t + 4 
(4) 
t + 6 
(5) 
t + 8 
(6) 
t + 10 
Panel A: Distance to the Border, <= 25km 
Discovery -0.031** -0.011 0.027 0.027 -0.023* -0.0021 
 (0.015) (0.017) (0.043) (0.050) (0.012) (0.071) 
Observations 18936 18130 17324 16518 15712 14906 
Panel B: Distance to the Border, <= 50km 
Discovery -0.030** -0.028 0.0015 0.0027 -0.024** -0.021 
 (0.012) (0.021) (0.028) (0.034) (0.011) (0.036) 
Observations 35269 33768 32267 30766 29265 27764 
Panel C: Distance to the Border, <= 100km 
Discovery -0.007 -0.006 -0.008 -0.008 -0.019** -0.015 
 (0.024) (0.022) (0.019) (0.022) (0.009) (0.021) 
Observations 63076 60392 57708 55024 52340 49656 
Panel D: Distance to the Border, < 100km 
Discovery -0.017 -0.002 -0.013 -0.012 0.011 0.019 
 (0.016) (0.017) (0.011) (0.013) (0.023) (0.024) 
Past Discovery Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cell Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cell-Specific Time Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country x Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 104550 100101 95652 91203 86754 82305 
Sample Period 1997-2012 1997-2012 1997-2012 1997-2012 1997-2012 1997-2012 
Notes: This table reports the effect of discovering at least one natural resource in a panel of cell-year observations. Numbers in parentheses 
are clustered standard errors at the country level. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
Past discovery is the number of years with discoveries from t-10 to t-1. 
 
Table A.20: Resource Discoveries and Civil Conflict Onset: Proximity to the borders: 
proximity to borders is known to be an indicator for conflict propensity. 






t + 2 
(3) 
t + 4 
(4) 
t + 6 
(5) 
t + 8 
(6) 
t + 10 
Panel A: Distance to the Border, <= 25km 
Discovery -0.303* -0.186 -0.149 0.013 -0.043 -0.29* 
 (0.176) (0.152) (0.152) (0.213) (0.154) (0.151) 
Observations 26642 25508 24374 23240 22106 20972 
Panel B: Distance to the Border, <= 50km 
Discovery -0.166 -0.02 -0.137 -0.022 -0.058 -0.207* 
 (0.120) (0.157) (0.104) (0.142) (0.097) (0.106) 
Observations 49588 47478 45368 43258 41148 39038 
Panel C: Distance to the Border, <= 100km 
Discovery -0.135 0.0012 -0.086 -0.0187 -0.029 -0.119* 
 (0.091) (0.095) (0.062) (0.080) (0.062) (0.067) 
Observations 88484 84719 80954 77189 73424 69659 
Panel D: Distance to the Border, < 100km 
Discovery -0.126* -0.045 0.083 -0.014 -0.032 -0.015 
 (0.065) (0.065) (0.169) (0.059) (0.043) (0.061) 
Past Discovery Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cell Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cell-Specific Time Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country x Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 146190 139969 133748 127527 121306 115085 
Sample Period 1989-2010 1989-2010 1989-2010 1989-2010 1989-2010 1989-2010 
Notes: This table reports the effect of discovering at least one natural resource in a panel of cell-year 
observations. Numbers in parentheses are clustered standard errors at the country level. ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Past discovery is the number of years with 










Table A.21: Resource Discoveries and Civil Conflict Onset: Higher levels of aggregation - is 


























Notes: This table reports the effect of discovering at least one natural resource in a panel of cell-year 
observations. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered at the country level. ***, **, and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Past discovery is the number of years 
with discoveries from t-10 to t-1. 
 
 
Table A.22: Resource Discoveries and Civil Conflict Onset: Higher levels of aggregation - is 
there evidence for an ecological inference fallacy? 






t + 2 
(3) 
t + 4 
(4) 
t + 6 
(5) 
t + 8 
(6) 
t + 10 
Panel A: Effect of Discovering Natural Resource (Oilfield + Minerals) 
Discovery -0.006 0.002 0.014 0.002 -0.001 0.012 
 (0.016) (0.020) (0.014) (0.019) (0.017) (0.018) 
Past Discovery -0.0009 -0.0009 -0.002 -0.0008 -0.0005 -0.0016 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) 
Panel B: Effect of Discovering Oilfield 
Discovery 0.09 -0.06** -0.018 -0.031 0.131 -0.033 
 (0.127) (0.029) (0.016) (0.022) (0.156) (0.022) 
Past Discovery -0.017 -0.012 -0.019 -0.017 -0.033 -0.017 
 (0.024) (0.022) (0.025) (0.025) (0.039) (0.025) 
Panel C: Effect of Discovering Mineral Resources 
Discovery -0.011 0.007 0.015 0.004 -0.01 0.016 
 (0.016) (0.021) (0.015) (0.019) (0.014) (0.020) 
Past Discovery 0.0003 -0.00003 -0.001 0.0004 0.002 -0.0005 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cell Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cell-Specific Time Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country x Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 23724 22715 21706 20697 19688 18679 
Sample Period 1997-2012 1997-2012 1997-2012 1997-2012 1997-2012 1997-2012 
Notes: This table reports the effect of discovering at least one natural resource in a panel of cell-year 
observations. Numbers in parentheses are clustered standard errors at the country level. ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Past discovery is the number of years with 














t + 2 
(3) 
t + 4 
(4) 
t + 6 
(5) 
t + 8 
(6) 
t + 10 
Panel A: Effect of Discovering Natural Resource (Oilfield + Minerals) 
Discovery -0.0009** 0.00003 -0.00004 0.00003 0.00005 -0.00000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Past Discovery -0.0008* -0.0008* -0.0008* -0.0008* -0.0009* -0.0009* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Panel B: Effect of Discovering Oilfield 
Discovery -0.0017 0.00006 0.00002 0.0002 0.0001 -0.0004 
 (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Past Discovery -0.0016 -0.0016 -0.0016 -0.0017 -0.00173 -0.0018 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Panel C: Effect of Discovering Mineral Resources 
Discovery -0.0007** 0.000001 -0.00005 -0.00001 0.00005 0.00013 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Past Discovery -0.0006* -0.0006* -0.0006* -0.0006* -0.0006* -0.0006* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cell Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cell-Specific Time Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country x Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 155524 148906 142288 135670 129052 122434 
Sample Period 1950-2008 1950-2008 1950-2008 1950-2008 1950-2008 1950-2008 
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Table A.23: Resource Discoveries and Civil Conflict Onset: Higher levels of aggregation - is 
there evidence for an ecological inference fallacy? 






t + 2 
(3) 
t + 4 
(4) 
t + 6 
(5) 
t + 8 
(6) 
t + 10 
Panel A: Effect of Discovering Natural Resource (Oilfield + Minerals) 
Discovery 0.037* -0.013 -0.009 0.009 -0.007 0.008 
 (0.021) (0.014) (0.017) (0.015) (0.019) (0.015) 
Past Discovery 0.00418 0.00401 0.00355 0.00154 0.00303 0.00176 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
Panel B: Effect of Discovering Oilfield 
Discovery -0.07 -0.07* -0.015 -0.016 -0.003 0.12 
 (0.061) (0.044) (0.030) (0.032) (0.025) (0.108) 
Past Discovery -0.004 0.008 0.0002 0.0003 -0.0009 -0.013 
 (0.023) (0.021) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.017) 
Panel C: Effect of Discovering Mineral Resources 
Discovery 0.04* -0.009 -0.009 0.011 -0.007 -0.0003 
 (0.023) (0.013) (0.018) (0.016) (0.020) (0.015) 
Past Discovery 0.00478 0.00381 0.00384 0.00169 0.00334 0.00280 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cell Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cell-Specific Time Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country x Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 55820 53445 51070 48695 46320 43945 
Sample Period 1989-2010 1989-2010 1989-2010 1989-2010 1989-2010 1989-2010 
Notes: This table reports the effect of discovering at least one natural resource in a panel of cell-year 
observations. Numbers in parentheses are clustered standard errors at the country level. ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Past discovery is the number of years with 




Table A.24: Natural Resource Discoveries and Civil Conflict Onset - Region Level Analysis 






t + 2 
(3) 
t + 4 
(4) 
t + 6 
(5) 
t + 8 
(6) 
t + 10 
Panel A: Effect of Discovering Natural Resource (Oilfield + Minerals) 
Discovery -0.1418 -0.1288 0.0518 -0.0037 0.3508 -0.0075 
 (0.229) (0.277) (0.156) (0.126) (0.272) (0.137) 
Past Discovery 0.0570 0.0766 0.0577 0.0637 0.0439 0.0638 
 (0.084) (0.098) (0.077) (0.079) (0.077) (0.088) 
Panel B: Effect of Discovering Oilfield 
Discovery 2.3318 0.2978 -1.7738 -0.1466 0.8011 -0.2219 
 (3.997) (1.756) (1.476) (0.370) (1.290) (0.243) 
Past Discovery 0.0533 -0.0615 0.0982 -0.0239 -0.1086 -0.0235 
 (0.538) (0.242) (0.385) (0.414) (0.464) (0.401) 
Panel C: Effect of Discovering Mineral Resources 
Discovery -0.3008 -0.1712 0.1583 0.0067 0.3191 0.0113 
 (0.210) (0.264) (0.131) (0.132) (0.279) (0.145) 
Past Discovery 0.0581 0.0898 0.0538 0.0714 0.0553 0.0713 
 (0.072) (0.099) (0.068) (0.070) (0.067) (0.082) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region-Specific Time Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country x Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 6912 6048 5184 4320 3456 2592 
Sample Period 1997-2012 1997-2012 1997-2012 1997-2012 1997-2012 1997-2012 
Notes: This table reports the effect of discovering at least one natural resource in a panel of region-year 
observations. Numbers in parentheses are clustered standard errors at the country level. ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Past discovery is the number of years with 









Table A.25: Natural Resource Discoveries and Civil Conflict Onset - Region Level Analysis 






t + 2 
(3) 
t + 4 
(4) 
t + 6 
(5) 
t + 8 
(6) 
t + 10 
Panel A: Effect of Discovering Natural Resource (Oilfield + Minerals) 
Discovery 0.3128 -0.0357 0.2964 0.1780 -0.1392 -0.0661 
 (0.262) (0.144) (0.351) (0.127) (0.088) (0.229) 
Past Discovery 0.1534 0.1454 0.1122 0.1281 0.1507 0.1463 
 (0.144) (0.150) (0.107) (0.140) (0.142) (0.153) 
Panel B: Effect of Discovering Oilfield 
Discovery 2.18957 -0.81107 -0.31285 1.00891 0.03216 0.34918 
 (2.696) (0.677) (0.344) (0.854) (0.045) (0.502) 
Past Discovery 0.1365 0.1329* 0.0910** -0.0200 0.0623* 0.0436 
 (0.085) (0.068) (0.042) (0.081) (0.036) (0.063) 
Panel C: Effect of Discovering Mineral Resources 
Discovery 0.1723 0.0130 0.3369 0.1145 -0.1485 -0.1016 
 (0.187) (0.146) (0.373) (0.124) (0.092) (0.252) 
Past Discovery 0.1574 0.1493 0.1169 0.1423 0.1602 0.1581 
 (0.159) (0.166) (0.120) (0.154) (0.156) (0.168) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region-Specific Time Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country x Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 9504 8640 7776 6912 6048 5184 
Sample Period 1989-2010 1989-2010 1989-2010 1989-2010 1989-2010 1989-2010 
Notes: This table reports the effect of discovering at least one natural resource in a panel of region-year 
observations. Numbers in parentheses are clustered standard errors at the country level. ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Past discovery is the number of years with 
discoveries from t-10 to t-1. 
 
 
Table A.26: Natural Resource Discoveries and Civil Conflict Onset - Country Level Analysis 






t + 2 
(3) 
t + 4 
(4) 
t + 6 
(5) 
t + 8 
(6) 
t + 10 
Panel A: Effect of Discovering Natural Resource (Oilfield + Minerals) 
Discovery -0.1992* 0.0623 0.0849 -0.0234 -0.0264 0.0852 
 (0.117) (0.093) (0.081) (0.078) (0.101) (0.168) 
Past Discovery -0.0618 -0.0653* -0.0668* -0.0582 -0.0584 -0.0625* 
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.038) (0.035) (0.036) 
Panel B: Effect of Discovering Oilfield 
Discovery -0.6504* -0.3020 -0.0692 0.5262 -0.8157* 0.3151 
 (0.331) (0.304) (0.181) (0.681) (0.478) (0.427) 
Past Discovery -0.4814*** -0.4244*** -0.4477*** -0.4836*** -0.3895*** -0.4685*** 
 (0.112) (0.100) (0.122) (0.130) (0.097) (0.106) 
Panel C: Effect of Discovering Mineral Resources 
Discovery -0.1881 0.0797 0.1000 -0.0845 0.0747 0.0624 
 (0.120) (0.098) (0.083) (0.064) (0.099) (0.172) 
Past Discovery -0.0412 -0.0465 -0.0476 -0.0345 -0.0421 -0.0413 
 (0.030) (0.031) (0.029) (0.028) (0.030) (0.029) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country x Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 768 670 572 474 376 282 
Sample Period 1997-2012 1997-2012 1997-2012 1997-2012 1997-2012 1997-2012 
Notes: This table reports the effect of discovering at least one natural resource in a panel of country-year 
observations. Numbers in parentheses are clustered standard errors at the country level. ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Past discovery is the number of years with 













Table A.27 - Natural Resource Discoveries and Civil Conflict Onset - Country Level 
Analysis 






t + 2 
(3) 
t + 4 
(4) 
t + 6 
(5) 
t + 8 
(6) 
t + 10 
Panel A: Effect of Discovering Natural Resource (Oilfield + Minerals) 
Discovery -0.0539 0.0379 0.0428 0.1496 0.0687 -0.0452 
 (0.077) (0.075) (0.092) (0.128) (0.084) (0.093) 
Past Discovery 0.0363 0.0334 0.0334 0.0268 0.0328 0.0385 
 (0.041) (0.042) (0.041) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) 
Panel B: Effect of Discovering Oilfield 
Discovery 0.3342* -0.2149 0.0651 0.0577 0.0389 -0.0996 
 (0.193) (0.150) (0.079) (0.070) (0.059) (0.081) 
Past Discovery 0.2985*** 0.3018*** 0.2786*** 0.2800*** 0.2811*** 0.2910*** 
 (0.081) (0.091) (0.076) (0.083) (0.079) (0.076) 
Panel C: Effect of Discovering Mineral Resources 
Discovery -0.0882 0.0633 0.0382 0.1578 0.0652 -0.0487 
 (0.082) (0.080) (0.099) (0.141) (0.091) (0.103) 
Past Discovery 0.0178 0.0125 0.0154 0.0079 0.0147 0.0201 
 (0.040) (0.041) (0.040) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country x Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1056 958 860 762 664 566 
Sample Period 1989-2010 1989-2010 1989-2010 1989-2010 1989-2010 1989-2010 
Notes: This table reports the effect of discovering at least one natural resource in a panel of country-year 
observations. Numbers in parentheses are clustered standard errors at the country level. ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Past discovery is the number of years with 
discoveries from t-10 to t-1. 
 
 
Table A.28: Resource Discoveries and Civil Conflict Onset: Restrict our sample to 
observations where at least one oilfield discovery was made 






t + 2 
(3) 
t + 4 
(4) 
t + 6 
(5) 
t + 8 
(6) 
t + 10 
Panel A: Effect of Discovering Natural Resource (Oilfield + Minerals) 
Discovery -0.00033 -0.00029 -0.00032 -0.00034 -0.00037 -0.00039 
 (0.00021) (0.00020) (0.00022) (0.00023) (0.00025) (0.00027) 
Past Discovery -0.00029 -0.00032 -0.00034 -0.00037 -0.00039 -0.00041 
 (0.00021) (0.00022) (0.00024) (0.00026) (0.00028) (0.00029) 
Panel B: Effect of Discovering Oilfield 
Discovery -0.00063 -0.00066 -0.00069 -0.00074 -0.00079 -0.00083 
 (0.00062) (0.00064) (0.00067) (0.00072) (0.00076) (0.00080) 
Past Discovery -0.00059 -0.00063 -0.00066 -0.00071 -0.00076 -0.00082 
 (0.00058) (0.00061) (0.00064) (0.00068) (0.00073) (0.00078) 
Panel C: Effect of Discovering Mineral Resources 
Discovery -0.00026 -0.00021 -0.00022 -0.00024 -0.00025 -0.00027 
 (0.00018) (0.00015) (0.00016) (0.00017) (0.00018) (0.00019) 
Past Discovery -0.00022 -0.00023 -0.00024 -0.00026 -0.00028 -0.00027 
 (0.00016) (0.00017) (0.00018) (0.00019) (0.00021) (0.00021) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cell Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cell-Specific Time Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country x Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 14679 14213 13747 13281 12815 12349 
Sample Period 1950-2008 1950-2008 1950-2008 1950-2008 1950-2008 1950-2008 
Notes: This table reports the effect of discovering at least one natural resource in a panel of cell-year 
observations. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered at the country level. ***, **, and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Past discovery is the number of years 










Table A.29: Resource Discoveries and Civil Conflict Onset: Restrict our sample to 
observations where at least one oilfield discovery was made 






t + 2 
(3) 
t + 4 
(4) 
t + 6 
(5) 
t + 8 
(6) 
t + 10 
Panel A: Effect of Discovering Natural Resource (Oilfield + Minerals) 
Discovery -0.003 -0.008 -0.016 -0.029*** -0.004 0.043 
 (0.016) (0.017) (0.012) (0.007) (0.024) (0.035) 
Past Discovery 0.004 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.005 0.003 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) 
Panel B: Effect of Discovering Oilfield 
Discovery -0.160* -0.122*** -0.058* -0.058 0.312 -0.017 
 (0.080) (0.025) (0.034) (0.034) (0.345) (0.028) 
Past Discovery -0.064 -0.016 -0.035 -0.035 -0.065 -0.039 
 (0.071) (0.049) (0.063) (0.063) (0.078) (0.063) 
Panel C: Effect of Discovering Mineral Resources 
Discovery 0.005 -0.002 -0.014 -0.027*** -0.026*** 0.046 
 (0.014) (0.018) (0.012) (0.006) (0.007) (0.036) 
Past Discovery 0.007 0.007 0.009 0.009 0.008 0.005 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cell Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cell-Specific Time Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country x Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1456 1408 1360 1312 1264 1216 
Sample Period 1997-2012 1997-2012 1997-2012 1997-2012 1997-2012 1997-2012 
Notes: This table reports the effect of discovering at least one natural resource in a panel of cell-year 
observations. Numbers in parentheses are clustered standard errors at the country level. ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Past discovery is the number of years with 
discoveries from t-10 to t-1. 
 
 
Table A.30: Resource Discoveries and Civil Conflict Onset: Restrict our sample to 
observations where at least one oilfield discovery was made 






t + 2 
(3) 
t + 4 
(4) 
t + 6 
(5) 
t + 8 
(6) 
t + 10 
Panel A: Effect of Discovering Natural Resource (Oilfield + Minerals) 
Discovery -0.005 0.001 -0.023*** -0.001 -0.007 0.006 
 (0.010) (0.013) (0.007) (0.015) (0.014) (0.016) 
Past Discovery 0.002 0.002 0.005 0.002 0.003 0.002 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Panel B: Effect of Discovering Oilfield 
Discovery -0.012 -0.025 -0.023 -0.021 -0.005 -0.002 
 (0.011) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.009) (0.007) 
Past Discovery 0.009 0.013 0.013 0.012 0.011 0.010 
 (0.010) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.012) (0.011) 
Panel C: Effect of Discovering Mineral Resources 
Discovery -0.005 0.003 -0.023*** 0.001 -0.007 0.007 
 (0.011) (0.014) (0.008) (0.016) (0.015) (0.017) 
Past Discovery 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.001 0.002 0.001 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cell Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cell-Specific Time Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country x Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2684 2596 2508 2420 2332 2244 
Sample Period 1989-2010 1989-2010 1989-2010 1989-2010 1989-2010 1989-2010 
Notes: This table reports the effect of discovering at least one natural resource in a panel of cell-year 
observations. Numbers in parentheses are clustered standard errors at the country level. ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Past discovery is the number of years with 









Table A.31: Resource Discoveries and Civil Conflict Onset: Using only the grids in which at 
least one conflict event occurs over the sample period (high-conflict-risk grids) 






t + 2 
(3) 
t + 4 
(4) 
t + 6 
(5) 
t + 8 
(6) 
t + 10 
Panel A: Effect of Discovering Natural Resource (Oilfield + Minerals) 
Discovery -0.0163** -0.0126** -0.0139*** -0.0153*** -0.0168*** -0.0182*** 
 (0.008) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) 
Past Discovery -0.0118** -0.0127** -0.0137** -0.0148*** -0.0159*** -0.0161*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Panel B: Effect of Discovering Oilfield 
Discovery -0.0069*** -0.0081*** -0.0093*** -0.0107*** -0.0122*** -0.0138*** 
 (0.00062) (0.00064) (0.00067) (0.00072) (0.00076) (0.00080) 
Past Discovery -0.00059 -0.00063 -0.00066 -0.00071 -0.00076 -0.00082 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Panel C: Effect of Discovering Mineral Resources 
Discovery -0.0069*** -0.0076*** -0.0084*** -0.0093*** -0.0102*** -0.0111*** 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) 
Past Discovery -0.0215*** -0.0226*** -0.0240*** -0.0255*** -0.0269*** -0.0265*** 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cell Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cell-Specific Time Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country x Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4536 4392 4248 4104 3960 3816 
Sample Period 1950-2008 1950-2008 1950-2008 1950-2008 1950-2008 1950-2008 
Notes: This table reports the effect of discovering at least one natural resource in a panel of cell-year 
observations. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered at the country level. ***, **, and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Past discovery is the number of years 
with discoveries from t-10 to t-1. 
 
 
Table A.32: Resource Discoveries and Civil Conflict Onset: Using only the grids in which at 
least one conflict event occurs over the sample period (high-conflict-risk grids) 






t + 2 
(3) 
t + 4 
(4) 
t + 6 
(5) 
t + 8 
(6) 
t + 10 
Panel A: Effect of Discovering Natural Resource (Oilfield + Minerals) 
Discovery -0.0256 -0.0197 -0.0574 -0.0775* -0.0049 0.0836 
 (0.063) (0.057) (0.035) (0.044) (0.089) (0.106) 
Past Discovery -0.01933 -0.0138 -0.0115 -0.0099 -0.0163 -0.0230 
 (0.037) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.031) 
Panel B: Effect of Discovering Oilfield 
Discovery -0.2241*** -0.1444*** -0.0829** -0.0944** 0.4480 -0.0711** 
 (0.073) (0.022) (0.035) (0.036) (0.397) (0.035) 
Past Discovery -0.1261 -0.0608 -0.0889 -0.0881 -0.1290 -0.0927 
 (0.081) (0.065) (0.078) (0.078) (0.090) (0.078) 
Panel C: Effect of Discovering Mineral Resources 
Discovery 0.0092 0.0026 -0.0558 -0.0766 -0.0592 0.0908 
 (0.065) (0.063) (0.038) (0.047) (0.076) (0.112) 
Past Discovery -0.0072 -0.0084 -0.0029 -0.0013 -0.0034 -0.0154 
 (0.037) (0.038) (0.037) (0.037) (0.036) (0.032) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cell Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cell-Specific Time Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country x Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 31096 30036 29012 28023 27068 26145 
Sample Period 1997-2012 1997-2012 1997-2012 1997-2012 1997-2012 1997-2012 
Notes: This table reports the effect of discovering at least one natural resource in a panel of cell-year 
observations. Numbers in parentheses are clustered standard errors at the country level. ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Past discovery is the number of years with 








Table A.33: Resource Discoveries and Civil Conflict Onset: Using only the grids in which at 
least one conflict event occurs over the sample period (high-conflict-risk grids) 






t + 2 
(3) 
t + 4 
(4) 
t + 6 
(5) 
t + 8 
(6) 
t + 10 
Panel A: Effect of Discovering Natural Resource (Oilfield + Minerals) 
Discovery -0.0267 0.0025 -0.0896*** 0.0307 -0.0382 0.0479 
 (0.039) (0.047) (0.024) (0.052) (0.048) (0.061) 
Past Discovery -0.0040 -0.0025 0.0075 -0.0049 0.0007 -0.0058 
 (0.018) (0.022) (0.020) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) 
Panel B: Effect of Discovering Oilfield 
Discovery -0.0479*** -0.2261*** -0.2279*** -0.2298***  0.8554*** 
 (0.008) (0.004) (0.007) (0.011)  (0.026) 
Past Discovery -0.1509*** -0.1767*** -0.1769*** -0.1771*** -0.1532*** -0.0371*** 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.011) 
Panel C: Effect of Discovering Mineral Resources 
Discovery -0.0267 0.0105 -0.0845*** 0.0402 -0.0344 0.0099 
 (0.040) (0.046) (0.023) (0.052) (0.049) (0.054) 
Past Discovery -0.0107 -0.0102 0.0004 -0.0124 -0.0061 -0.00950 
 (0.019) (0.021) (0.020) (0.017) (0.018) (0.020) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cell Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cell-Specific Time Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country x Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 38228 36925 35666 34450 33276 32142 
Sample Period 1989-2010 1989-2010 1989-2010 1989-2010 1989-2010 1989-2010 
Notes: This table reports the effect of discovering at least one natural resource in a panel of cell-year 
observations. Numbers in parentheses are clustered standard errors at the country level. ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Past discovery is the number of years with 
discoveries from t-10 to t-1. 
 
 
Table A.34: Resource Discoveries and Civil Conflict Onset: Buffer zone analysis because as 
some oilfield or mine discoveries cross grid boundaries 






t + 2 
(3) 
t + 4 
(4) 
t + 6 
(5) 
t + 8 
(6) 
t + 10 
Panel A: Effect of Discovering Natural Resource (Oilfield + Minerals) 
Discovery -0.0001** -0.00004 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.001 0.0001 
 (0.00005) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.001) (0.0001) 
Past Discovery -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001** -0.0001 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.00006) (0.0001) 
Panel B: Effect of Discovering Oilfield 
Discovery -0.0001 0.00001 -0.00001 0.00003 0.00002 -0.00004 
 (0.0002) (0.00002) (0.00003) (0.00003) (0.00002) (0.00004) 
Past Discovery -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 
 (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Panel C: Effect of Discovering Mineral Resources 
Discovery -0.0001** -0.00005 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.001 -0.0001 
 (0.00005) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.001) (0.0001) 
Past Discovery -0.00003 -0.00002 -0.00002 -0.00002 -0.0001** -0.000 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.00005) (0.000) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cell Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cell-Specific Time Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country x Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 605163 579411 553659 527907 502155 476403 
Sample Period 1950-2008 1950-2008 1950-2008 1950-2008 1950-2008 1950-2008 
Notes: This table reports the effect of discovering at least one natural resource in a panel of cell-year 
observations. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered at the country level. ***, **, and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Past discovery is the number of years 








Table A.35: Resource Discoveries and Civil Conflict Onset: Buffer zone analysis because as 
some oilfield or mine discoveries cross grid boundaries 






t + 2 
(3) 
t + 4 
(4) 
t + 6 
(5) 
t + 8 
(6) 
t + 10 
Panel A: Effect of Discovering Natural Resource (Oilfield + Minerals) 
Discovery -0.0064 -0.0028 0.0053 -0.0043 0.0044 0.0005 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) 
Past Discovery -0.0038 -0.0031 -0.0041 -0.0031 -0.0038 -0.0035 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Panel B: Effect of Discovering Oilfield 
Discovery -0.054* -0.045** -0.013 0.0097 0.029 0.00075 
 (0.028) (0.021) (0.012) (0.013) (0.034) (0.007) 
Past Discovery -0.0082 -0.00085 -0.0037 -0.0062 -0.0085 -0.0051 
 (0.010) (0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.012) (0.009) 
Panel C: Effect of Discovering Mineral Resources 
Discovery -0.0046 -0.0011 0.0066 -0.0054 0.0021 0.0005 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) 
Past Discovery -0.0036 -0.0032 -0.0042 -0.0029 -0.0035 -0.0034 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cell Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cell-Specific Time Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country x Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 171088 163808 156528 149248 141968 134688 
Sample Period 1997-2012 1997-2012 1997-2012 1997-2012 1997-2012 1997-2012 
Notes: This table reports the effect of discovering at least one natural resource in a panel of cell-year 
observations. Numbers in parentheses are clustered standard errors at the country level. ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Past discovery is the number of years with 
discoveries from t-10 to t-1. 
 
 
Table A.36: Resource Discoveries and Civil Conflict Onset: Buffer zone analysis because as 
some oilfield or mine discoveries cross grid boundaries 






t + 2 
(3) 
t + 4 
(4) 
t + 6 
(5) 
t + 8 
(6) 
t + 10 
Panel A: Effect of Discovering Natural Resource (Oilfield + Minerals) 
Discovery -0.0012 -0.0013 -0.0094** 0.0083 -0.0068 0.0035 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) 
Past Discovery 0.0001 0.0003 0.0012 -0.0006 0.0007 -0.0001 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Panel B: Effect of Discovering Oilfield 
Discovery -0.020 -0.011 -0.012 0.026 -0.0011 0.012 
 (0.015) (0.012) (0.012) (0.027) (0.003) (0.010) 
Past Discovery 0.002 0.004 0.004 0.0002 0.0031 0.0019 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) 
Panel C: Effect of Discovering Mineral Resources 
Discovery -0.0005 -0.0006 -0.009** 0.007 -0.007 0.003 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) 
Past Discovery -0.00009 0.00001 0.0009 -0.0007 0.0005 -0.0003 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cell Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cell-Specific Time Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country x Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 235246 225236 215226 205216 195206 185196 
Sample Period 1989-2010 1989-2010 1989-2010 1989-2010 1989-2010 1989-2010 
Notes: This table reports the effect of discovering at least one natural resource in a panel of cell-year 
observations. Numbers in parentheses are clustered standard errors at the country level. ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Past discovery is the number of years with 








Table A.37: Resource Discovery and Civil Conflict Onset: Between-Cell Effects 
Dependent Variable: Intrastate Civil Conflict Onset (PRIO-GRID Conflict Dataset) 




t + 2 
(3) 
t + 4 
(4) 
t + 6 
(5) 
t + 8 
(6) 
t + 10 
Panel A: Effect of Discovering Natural Resource (Oilfield + Minerals) 
Discovery -9.99217*** -9.88875*** -10.06867*** -9.90409*** -9.95843*** -10.10830*** 
 (0.165) (0.173) (0.176) (0.191) (0.178) (0.176) 
Past Discovery -9.79241*** -9.79884*** -9.75150*** -9.87807*** -9.76863*** -9.72431*** 
 (0.159) (0.156) (0.156) (0.144) (0.142) (0.138) 
Panel B: Effect of Discovering Oilfield 
Discovery -8.20426*** -8.67506*** -9.33092*** -8.38673*** -8.81813*** -8.89384*** 
 (0.474) (0.382) (0.371) (0.420) (0.465) (0.370) 
Past Discovery -8.50334*** -8.68739*** -8.66171*** -8.91138*** -8.94575*** -8.95123*** 
 (0.360) (0.361) (0.349) (0.327) (0.314) (0.302) 
Panel C: Effect of Discovering Mineral Resources 
Discovery -10.23379*** -10.09510*** -10.23332*** -10.13618*** -10.19136*** -10.36345*** 
 (0.175) (0.186) (0.189) (0.197) (0.179) (0.181) 
Past Discovery -10.01432*** -10.02107*** -9.98226*** -10.10128*** -9.97104*** -9.91629*** 
 (0.168) (0.165) (0.164) (0.153) (0.154) (0.149) 
Country x Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 605163 579411 553659 527907 502155 476403 
Sample Period 1950-2008 1950-2008 1950-2008 1950-2008 1950-2008 1950-2008 
Notes: In Table 4, we present linear probability model (LPM) estimations corresponding to the between-cell variations in natural resource 
discovery and internal armed conflict, for a given country in a given year. This table reports the effect of discovering at least one natural 
resource on intra state civil conflict onset in a panel of cell-year observations using generalized linear model (GLM) estimations by allowing 
non-linear form of relationship between the dependent and independent variables using logit as the link function. Unfortunately the GLM 
(logit) estimators do not converge when using cell-specific fixed effects and cell-specific time trends. Thus, this table shows results of 
between-cell specification, for a given country in a given year. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered at the country 
level. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Past discovery is the number of years with 
discoveries from t-10 to t-1. 
 
 
Table A.38: Natural Resource Discoveries and Civil Conflict Onset: Between-Cell Effects 







t + 2 
(3) 
t + 4 
(4) 
t + 6 
(5) 
t + 8 
(6) 
t + 10 
Panel A: Effect of Discovering Natural Resource (Oilfield + Minerals) 
Discovery 0.05379 0.001 -14.20984*** 0.48100 -0.64728 0.50983 
 (0.704) (0.012) (0.356) (0.480) (1.043) (0.532) 
Past Discovery -0.51079*** -0.50310** -0.64495*** -0.46022** -0.55163*** -0.46157*** 
 (0.168) (0.199) (0.173) (0.180) (0.168) (0.177) 
Panel B: Effect of Discovering Oilfield 
Discovery -13.31496*** -14.00878*** -14.60325*** -14.47699*** -14.18940*** 2.71842*** 
 (0.601) (1.065) (0.945) (1.019) (0.893) (0.220) 
Past Discovery 0.76714 0.86236 0.92734 0.90075 0.87360 0.20432 
 (0.755) (0.778) (0.761) (0.777) (0.756) (0.752) 
Panel C: Effect of Discovering Mineral Resources 
Discovery -0.09930 0.15698 -14.17926*** 0.62582 -0.53845 0.12517 
 (0.706) (0.547) (0.383) (0.474) (1.044) (0.647) 
Past Discovery -0.48368** -0.46403** -0.61582*** -0.41630** -0.51941*** -0.47460** 
 (0.189) (0.224) (0.193) (0.188) (0.190) (0.190) 
Country x Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 235246 225236 215226 205216 195206 185196 
Sample Period 1989-2010 1989-2010 1989-2010 1989-2010 1989-2010 1989-2010 
Notes: In Table 7, we present linear probability model (LPM) estimations corresponding to the within-cell 
variations in natural resource discovery and internal armed conflict, for a given grid cell in a given year. This 
table presents between-cell specification to identify the effect of discovering at least one natural resource on 
intra state civil conflict onset in a panel of cell-year observations. We apply generalized linear model (GLM) 
estimations by allowing non-linear form of relationship between the dependent and independent variables using 
logit as the link function. Unfortunately the GLM (logit) estimators do not converge when using cell-specific 
fixed effects and cell-specific time trends. Thus, this table shows results of between-cell specification, for a 
given country in a given year. Numbers in parentheses are clustered standard errors at the country level. ***, **, 
and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Past discovery is the number 








Table A.39: Natural Resource Discoveries and Civil Conflict Onset: Between-Cell Effects 






t + 2 
(3) 
t + 4 
(4) 
t + 6 
(5) 
t + 8 
(6) 
t + 10 
Panel A: Effect of Discovering Natural Resource (Oilfield + Minerals) 
Discovery 0.13601 -0.44234 -1.20587 -1.07254 0.16240 -1.07681** 
 (0.639) (0.769) (0.975) (1.043) (0.834) (0.544) 
Past Discovery -0.35465* -0.40104* -0.45752** -0.43194** -0.34429 -0.24718 
 (0.203) (0.220) (0.230) (0.216) (0.218) (0.192) 
Panel B: Effect of Discovering Oilfield 
Discovery -13.69671*** -14.85308*** -14.57906*** -14.29653*** 2.64003 -13.61183*** 
 (0.628) (0.832) (0.892) (0.900) (2.023) (0.817) 
Past Discovery 0.67152 0.80472 0.81476 0.80658 -0.03672 0.73593 
 (0.540) (0.550) (0.543) (0.545) (1.126) (0.537) 
Panel C: Effect of Discovering Mineral Resources 
Discovery 0.20508 -0.30249 -1.11986 -0.98147 -0.47976 -1.17787** 
 (0.628) (0.777) (0.979) (1.048) (1.104) (0.548) 
Past Discovery 0.32786 0.36267 0.42799* 0.40200* 0.35710 0.20512 
 (0.221) (0.243) (0.250) (0.235) (0.231) (0.210) 
Country x Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 171088 163808 156528 149248 141968 134688 
Sample Period 1997-2012 1997-2012 1997-2012 1997-2012 1997-2012 1997-2012 
Notes: In Table 8, we present linear probability model (LPM) estimations corresponding to the within-cell variations in natural resource 
discovery and internal armed conflict, for a given grid cell in a given year. This table presents between-cell specification to identify the 
effect of discovering at least one natural resource on intra state civil conflict onset in a panel of cell-year observations. We apply generalized 
linear model (GLM) estimations by allowing non-linear form of relationship between the dependent and independent variables using logit as 
the link function. Unfortunately the GLM (logit) estimators do not converge when using cell-specific fixed effects and cell-specific time 
trends. Thus, this table shows results of between-cell specification, for a given country in a given year. Numbers in parentheses are clustered 
standard errors at the country level. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Past discovery 
is the number of years with discoveries from t-10 to t-1. 
 
 
Table A.40: Resource Discoveries and Civil Conflict Incidence: Between-Cell Effects 






t + 2 
(3) 
t + 4 
(4) 
t + 6 
(5) 
t + 8 
(6) 
t + 10 
Panel A: Effect of Discovering Natural Resource (Oilfield + Minerals) 
Discovery 0.61685 -0.44734 -0.95521 0.33178 -0.09323 0.31769 
 (0.529) (0.567) (0.764) (0.468) (0.552) (0.448) 
Past Discovery -0.34661** -0.40332** -0.43947*** -0.32678* -0.36629** -0.32986* 
 (0.173) (0.197) (0.170) (0.194) (0.164) (0.171) 
Panel B: Effect of Discovering Oilfield 
Discovery -2.50228** -14.27869*** -14.74772*** -14.69127*** -14.37400*** 2.60520*** 
 (1.040) (1.050) (0.992) (0.992) (0.861) (0.315) 
Past Discovery 0.14655 0.34117 0.39884 0.38527 0.35259 -0.30947 
 (0.866) (0.809) (0.800) (0.804) (0.787) (0.768) 
Panel C: Effect of Discovering Mineral Resources 
Discovery 0.22803 -0.40640 -0.88620 0.44140 -0.02697 0.03083 
 (0.674) (0.579) (0.775) (0.454) (0.566) (0.490) 
Past Discovery -0.36468* -0.41092* -0.44480** -0.32608 -0.37070** -0.36590* 
 (0.202) (0.233) (0.203) (0.219) (0.188) (0.195) 
Country x Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 235246 225236 215226 205216 195206 185196 
Sample Period 1989-2010 1989-2010 1989-2010 1989-2010 1989-2010 1989-2010 
Notes: In Table A.11 (online appendix), we present linear probability model (LPM) estimations corresponding 
to the within-cell variations in natural resource discovery and internal armed conflict, for a given grid cell in a 
given year. This table presents between-cell specification to identify the effect of discovering at least one natural 
resource on intra state civil conflict incidence in a panel of cell-year observations. We apply generalized linear 
model (GLM) estimations by allowing non-linear form of relationship between the dependent and independent 
variables using logit as the link function. Unfortunately the GLM (logit) estimators do not converge when using 
cell-specific fixed effects and cell-specific time trends. Thus, this table shows results of between-cell 
specification, for a given country in a given year. Numbers in parentheses are clustered standard errors at the 
country level. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Past 







Table A.41: Natural Resource Discoveries and Civil Conflict Incidence: Between-Cell 
Effects 






t + 2 
(3) 
t + 4 
(4) 
t + 6 
(5) 
t + 8 
(6) 
t + 10 
Panel A: Effect of Discovering Natural Resource (Oilfield + Minerals) 
Discovery 0.32094 -0.50066 -0.27321 -0.70473 0.40180 0.59259 
 (0.654) (0.484) (0.341) (0.519) (0.404) (0.560) 
Past Discovery -0.57404*** -0.63116*** -0.61070*** -0.63422*** -0.54634** -0.53377** 
 (0.216) (0.240) (0.225) (0.219) (0.220) (0.233) 
Panel B: Effect of Discovering Oilfield 
Discovery -14.17731*** -15.23341*** -14.65802*** -14.55947*** 1.91589* -13.77314*** 
 (0.631) (0.826) (0.904) (0.915) (1.042) (0.732) 
Past Discovery 0.59095 0.75014 0.71934 0.72245 0.22041 0.64819 
 (0.542) (0.553) (0.546) (0.547) (0.589) (0.534) 
Panel C: Effect of Discovering Mineral Resources 
Discovery 0.39171 -0.39255 -0.21120 -0.63307 0.21238 0.66407 
 (0.636) (0.486) (0.340) (0.505) (0.400) (0.574) 
Past Discovery -0.57155** -0.62003** -0.60306** -0.62832*** -0.56191** -0.52573** 
 (0.232) (0.262) (0.243) (0.236) (0.231) (0.253) 
Country x Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 171088 163808 156528 149248 141968 134688 
Sample Period 1997-2012 1997-2012 1997-2012 1997-2012 1997-2012 1997-2012 
Notes: In Table 8, we present linear probability model (LPM) estimations corresponding to the within-cell 
variations in natural resource discovery and internal armed conflict, for a given grid cell in a given year. This 
table presents between-cell specification to identify the effect of discovering at least one natural resource on 
intra state civil conflict incidence in a panel of cell-year observations. We apply generalized linear model 
(GLM) estimations by allowing non-linear form of relationship between the dependent and independent 
variables using logit as the link function. Unfortunately the GLM (logit) estimators do not converge when using 
cell-specific fixed effects and cell-specific time trends. Thus, this table shows results of between-cell 
specification, for a given country in a given year. Numbers in parentheses are clustered standard errors at the 
country level. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Past 
discovery is the number of years with discoveries from t-10 to t-1. 
 
Table A.42: Natural Resource Discoveries and Civil Conflict Intensity: Between-Cell Effects 






t + 2 
(3) 
t + 4 
(4) 
t + 6 
(5) 
t + 8 
(6) 
t + 10 
Panel A: Effect of Discovering Natural Resource (Oilfield + Minerals) 
Discovery -0.43616 -0.51811 0.58124 0.04404 -0.22738 -0.07335 
 (22.851) (36.476) (24.959) (39.342) (43.806) (40.988) 
Past Discovery -0.10895 -0.05430 -0.17744 -0.11888 -0.09490 -0.10841 
 (20.854) (22.664) (19.808) (21.651) (20.388) (21.306) 
Panel B: Effect of Discovering Oilfield 
Discovery 3.93701 -0.25112 -0.33304 -0.32752 -0.25660 1.23859 
 (2.155e+10) (2.254e+10) (2.358e+10) (2.478e+10) (1.758e+10) (1.977e+10) 
Past Discovery -0.32449 -0.25773 -0.24919 -0.24977 -0.25983 -0.40000 
 (2.530e+10) (2.503e+10) (2.475e+10) (2.536e+10) (2.448e+10) (2.182e+10) 
Panel C: Effect of Discovering Mineral Resources 
Discovery -0.53762 -0.53762 0.64498 0.07667 -0.22405 -0.18037 
 (36.518) (36.518) (23.918) (38.094) (44.274) (43.405) 
Past Discovery -0.09099 -0.03785 -0.17085 -0.10816 -0.08167 -0.08549 
 (20.943) (22.845) (20.285) (21.756) (20.482) (21.369) 
Country x Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 235246 225236 215226 205216 195206 185196 
Sample Period 1989-2010 1989-2010 1989-2010 1989-2010 1989-2010 1989-2010 
Notes: In Table A.12, we present ordinary least squares (OLS) estimations corresponding to the within-cell 
variations in natural resource discovery and internal armed conflict, for a given grid cell in a given year. This 
table presents between-cell specification to identify the effect of discovering at least one natural resource on 
intra state civil conflict intensity in a panel of cell-year observations. We apply Poisson regression model 
estimations by fitting our specification where the dependent variable is measured as the number of occurrences 
(counts) of conflict events (conflict intensity) observed in a cell-year. Unfortunately the Poisson regression do 
not converge when using cell-specific fixed effects and cell-specific time trends. Thus, this table shows results 
of between-cell specification, for a given country in a given year. Numbers in parentheses are clustered standard 
errors at the country level. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. Past discovery is the number of years with discoveries from t-10 to t-1. 
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Table A.43: Natural Resource Discoveries and Civil Conflict Intensity: Between-Cell Effects 






t + 2 
(3) 
t + 4 
(4) 
t + 6 
(5) 
t + 8 
(6) 
t + 10 
Panel A: Effect of Discovering Natural Resource (Oilfield + Minerals) 
Discovery 0.27763 -1.38215 -1.21117*** -1.01569*** -0.13121 -0.53523 
 (0.42312e+5) (0.12856e+5) (0.249) (0.146) (0.314) (0.375) 
Past Discovery -0.57159*** -0.73233*** -0.43803** -0.47460** -0.56366** -0.61994*** 
 (0.209) (0.213) (0.201) (0.211) (0.226) (0.229) 
Panel B: Effect of Discovering Oilfield 
Discovery -0.87147 -0.25112 -0.86225 -0.73577 2.52410 -0.40768 
 (0.1733e+8) (0.2266e+8) (0.2826e+8) (0.2715e+8) (0.2617e+8) (0.2466e+8) 
Past Discovery -0.32449 -0.25773 -0.24919 -0.24977 -0.25983 -0.40000 
 (0.1341e+8) (0.1348e+8) (0.1407e+8) (0.1388e+8) (0.1615e+8) (0.1381e+8) 
Panel C: Effect of Discovering Mineral Resources 
Discovery 0.33491 -1.39273 1.33418*** 1.15600*** -0.05613 -0.53954 
 (0.39275e+5) (0.12459e+5) (0.248) (0.151) (0.316) (0.376) 
Past Discovery 0.59976*** 0.76557*** 0.45195** 0.49116** 0.60867*** 0.64880*** 
 (0.210) (0.215) (0.203) (0.213) (0.227) (0.230) 
Country x Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 171088 163808 156528 149248 141968 134688 
Sample Period 1997-2012 1997-2012 1997-2012 1997-2012 1997-2012 1997-2012 
Notes: In Table A.12 (online appendix), we present ordinary least squares (OLS) estimations corresponding to 
the within-cell variations in natural resource discovery and internal armed conflict, for a given grid cell in a 
given year. This table presents between-cell specification to identify the effect of discovering at least one natural 
resource on intra state civil conflict intensity in a panel of cell-year observations. We apply Poisson regression 
model estimations by fitting our specification where the dependent variable is measured as the number of 
occurrences (counts) of conflict events (conflict intensity) observed in a cell-year. Unfortunately the Poisson 
regression do not converge when using cell-specific fixed effects and cell-specific time trends. Thus, this table 
shows results of between-cell specification, for a given country in a given year. Numbers in parentheses are 
clustered standard errors at the country level. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% level, respectively. Past discovery is the number of years with discoveries from t-10 to t-1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
